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Note
The Caryl Chessman Case:
A Legal Analysis
The authors of this Note analyze the major legal issues in-
volved in the Chessman case. They conclude that Chessman
was accorded all of his rights under the law, that the com-
plexity of the legal issues did not warrant twelve years of
litigation, and that judicial indecision was the principal factor
which accounted for the years of delay.
In 1948 Caryl Chessman, having been sentenced to suffer the pun-
ishment of death by lethal gas, was confined to a cell on San Quen-
tin's death row. The events which had brought Caryl Chessman to
death row, while sensational, were not unlike those which had
placed many criminals in the same plight. The future- the years of
criminal appeals, many of which Chessman himself launched and
conducted from his prison cell-was from the standpoint of time
alone to be unique in the annals of criminal justice. Not until nearly
twelve years had passed did Chessman's execution bring to a close
the series of dramatic legal controversies and timely stays of
execution.
During the months immediately preceding Chessman's execution,
the Chessman case became an international issue. To many, Chess-
man had done expiation for his crimes by spending twelve years
on death row while his case was litigated through the courts. Public
attention was also turned toward the efficacy of the death penalty
in modem society. Because of the clamor of public opinion over the
capital punishment controversy, the legal issues which were raised
by the Chessman case were all but obscured. It is with these legal
issues that this Note proposes to deal.
I. Ti FAcTs
A. The Crimes and the Criminal
Chessman's history was one replete with violations of the law and
with commitments to reform school and prior criminal convictions.
The events which led to Chessman's last convictions, as the jury
found them, were as follows:
On January 3, 1948, Chessman committed armed robbery by tak-
ing $500.00 in cash and $300.00 in checks from a store in Pasadena,
California.
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On January 13, 1948, Chessman stole a car parked in the city of
Pasadena.
On January 18, 1948, Chessman committed first degree robbery
by taking approximately $15.00 from two persons on the Pacific
Coast Highway and by taking over $20.00 from two other persons
near the Rose Bowl.
On January 19, 1948, Chessman approached a man and a woman
seated in a parked car, robbed between $35.00 and $50.00 from the
man in the car and carried the woman away some twenty-two feet
to the car he was driving. With threat of death, he forced her to
commit fellatio. He then took approximately $5.00 from his victim's
purse, permitted her to get out of the car, and drove away.
On January 20, 1948, Chessman committed first degree robbery
against two persons in the vicinity of Mulholland Drive.
On January 22, 1948, Chessman approached a man and woman
parked in a car on Mulholland Drive. When the man in the car
told Chessman that he had no money, Chessman ordered the woman
into his car. After he had driven away and parked the car, Chessman
forced the woman to unclothe and to commit fellatio and attempted
to rape her. He then drove her to within a block of her home where
she was allowed to leave his car.
On January 23, 1948, Chessman and a confederate entered a
clothing store in Redondo and committed first degree robbery. Both
the proprietor and his employee were ordered into a back room.
Chessman then took the employee into the front of the store and
ordered him to open the cash register from which Chessman took
$227.30. When the employee was again in the back room, both the
employee and the proprietor were relieved of their personal money.
Three hundred dollars worth of clothing was also taken from the
store.
Later, on the night of January 23, 1948, when Chessman and his
confederate were still in possession of the money and clothing taken
from the store, police identified the car in which they were driving.
After a chase at speeds ranging up to eighty-five miles an hour, the
police stopped Chessman by running into the side of his car. Chess-
man fled on foot but police managed to capture both him and his
confederate.
B. The Litigation and the Appeals'
Chessman was tried by jury in the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of Los Angeles on charges of eight-
een felonies. Although during the course of the trial he was advised
by a deputy public defender, Chessman himself conducted his own
1. It is the purpose of this section to list in skeletal form the major litigation and
to present only a brief statement of the points pressed during these appeals.
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defense throughout the trial. On May 21, 1948, the jury found
Chessman guilty of seventeen felonies including two violations of
the "Little Lindbergh Law" with penalties set at death.
Before the California Supreme Court heard Chessmans automatic
appeal which is accorded by the State of California in all capital
cases, Chessman moved in the supreme court for augmentation and
correction of the record. On May 19, 1950, the California court
granted the motion for augmentation by allowing the inclusion in
the transcript of the voir dire examination of the jurors and the
opening argument of the prosecution. The court held that the trans-
cript was adequate to permit a review. People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.
2d 455, 218 P.2d 769, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 840 (1950).
Having exhausted his state remedies and having been denied a,
petition for writ of certiorari on the transcript issue, Chessman pe-
titioned the United States District Court for the Northern Division
of California for a writ of habeas corpus. Relief was denied by the
federal district court and by the federal court of appeals, and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Chessman v. Cali-
fornia, 341 U.S. 929 (1951).
On December 18, 1951, the California Supreme Court considered
Chessman's appeal on its merits and affirmed his conviction. People
v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 915 (1952).
On May 19, 1952, Chessman again petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern Division
of California. The petition was denied without hearing and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Chessman v. People, 205 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
916 (1953).
On July 16, 1954, Chessman filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court of California which was denied on
July 21, 1954. On July 29, 1954, Justice Carter of the California
Supreme Court granted a stay of execution. Ex parte Chessman, 43
Cal. 2d 296,273 P.2d 268, motion to vacate stay of execution denied,
43 Cal. 2d 391, 274 P.2d 645 (1954). After Justice Carter had
granted the stay of execution but before the California Supreme
Court had refused to vacate the stay, Chessman, on August 14,
1954, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court from the California court's denial of a writ of
habeas corpus on July 21, 1954. The petition for certiorari, in which
Chessman charged that the transcript had been fraudently prepared,
was denied "without prejudice to an application for writ of habeas
corpus in an appropriate United States District Court." Chessman
v. California, 348 U.S. 864 (1954).
Chessman once again fied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
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in the United States District Court for the Northern Division of
California. That petition was dismissed without a hearing. In re
Chessman, 128 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd sub noma., Chessman
v. Teets, 221 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1955). The United States Su-
preme Court reversed, remanded to the district court and held that
if the allegations of fraud in preparation of the transcript were
true, Chessman had been denied due process. Chessman v. Teets,
350 U.S. 3 (1955).
On remand, the federal district court found that there had been
no fraud in preparation of the transcript. Chessman v. Teets, 138 F.
Supp. 761 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 289 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1956). The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited
question whether Chessman had been denied due process by not
being allowed to be present at the proceeding to settle his transcript.
Chessman v. Teets, 353 U.S. 928 (1957). The United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgments of the court of appeals and of the
district court and held that California was required to grant a hear-
ing to settle the transcript at which either Chessman or his counsel
would be present. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
In February 1958, a second settlement hearing on the transcript
was held in Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court denied,
Chessman's motion to reject the reporter's transcript and to find
that no usable or adequate transcript was available. However, be-
cause the court made ninety changes not in accord with its original
order and without notice to Chessman or hearing on the corrections,
the California Supreme Court ordered the lower court to hold an-
other hearing with either Chessman or his counsel present to deter-
mine objections to the ninety changes. Chessman v. Superior Court,
50 Cal. 2d 835, 330 P.2d 225 (1958).
At the re-resettlement hearing in the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County, the ninety changes were allowed to stand. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed the findings of the
superior court that the resettled transcript was adequate. People v.
Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 341 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 925
(1959).
Subsequently, in another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
federal court, Chessman attacked the resettlement proceedings held
by the California court and also alleged that his lengthy confinement
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. This petition was denied
by the federal district court and by the court of appeals. Chessman
v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1960).
On May 2, 1960, after attempts at obtaining clemency, reprieves,





The chief grounds upon which Chessman made his numerous
appeals involved questions of preparation and adequacy of the court
reporter's record of the trial. Before all of the reporter's notes of the
oral proceedings had been transcribed, the court reporter who had
taken them died. Since the California Rules on Appeal do not pro-
vide for a procedure when transcription cannot be completed by the
reporter himself,2 Chessman argued that a new trial should be
granted. The trial court, however, ordered a substitute court reporter
to transcribe the balance of the notes.3 After the prosecutor had ap-
proved the transcript, a copy was sent to Chessman who was then
incarcerated in San Quentin. He requested in writing a number of
specific changes and charged that the transcript was inaccurate
and incomplete." At a hearing at which Chessman was neither pres-
ent nor represented by counsel,5 the trial judge allowed some of
2. CAL. R. oN APP. 33(c) provides: "Where a judgment of death has been
rendered and an appeal is taken automatically as provided by law, the entire record
of the action shall be prepared."
CAL. R. ox App. 83(a) provides that a normal record on appeal shall include,
among other records, "a reporter's transcript of the oral proceedings taken on the
trial of the cause and on the hearing of the motion for a new trial ... "
CAL. R. oN App. 35(b) provides that "the reporter shall prepare an original and
3 clearly legible typewritten copies of the reporter's transcript... and shall append
to the original and each copy a certificate that it is correct."
3. In place of the certification that the transcript was correct as provided by CAL.
R. O N App. 35(b), the substitute reporter certified that the transcript prepared by
him was "a full, true and complete transcript of said shorthand notes of said Ernest
R. Perry, deceased, [the original court reporter] upon said trial to the best of my
ability." People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 459, 218 P.2d 769, 771, cert. denied,
340 U.S. 840 (1950).
4. At this time, Chessman requested some 200 corrections to the transcript; the
trial judge allowed some 80 of the corrections.
Chessman made the following computation to support his contention that the
transcription had been abridged:
Ernest Perry, the dead court reporter, dictated 593 pages of testimony from 15
hours and 45 minutes of trial before he died. Stanley Fraser, who finished from
Perry's notes, dictated 1,194 pages from 34 hours and 20 minutes of trial, Chess-
man said. From that, in one of the legal documents prepared for his appeals,
he calculated that Perry produced an average of 37.9 pages per trial hour,
while Fraser produced only 34.8 pages.
'It is thus mathematically certain,' Chessman wrote, "that if Mr. Perry had
transcribed his own notes of that portion of the trial transcribed by Fraser, he
would have produced 3.1 pages of dictation more per trial hour. To state this
another way, in dictating Mr. Perry's notes, Fraser has 'lost' 3.1 pages of pro-
ceedings for every trial hour . . .more than 105 pages of the oral proceedings."
Actually, Chessman apparently slipped on his arithmetic. Perry's average
would have been 37.7 pages per trial hour; the difference between him and
Fraser, 2.9 pages per hour, and the so-called "loss" in Fraser's transcription,
about 98 pages.
Bernhard, Were 105 Pages of Record Lost?, San Francisco Call-Bulletin, reproduced
in appendix to CnEseAN, TAL. BY ORDEAL 309 (1955).
5. See note 66 infra.
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the changes and denied others, after which he certified the record. 7
On appeal from the trial court's order, the California Supreme
Court held that the record was adequate to permit the court to
ascertain whether there had been a fair trial or any miscarriage of
justice.8 Subsequently, Chessman raised the question in the federal
courts of his right to counsel at the settlement hearing. After the
United States Supreme Court had held that the ex parte settlement
was a denial of due process,9 another settlement hearing was held
in California superior court at which Chessman was present and
represented by counsel.'0 On appeal to the California Supreme
Court, the resettled transcript was again found to be "substantially
accurate and sufficiently complete in every respect to permit a fair
review of the appeal from the judgment of conviction.""
6. The following changes were among those allowed by the trial judge:
"The gentleman in Esquire" to read "General Eisenhower."









"Edith Owens" to "Bertha Case."
"Jonathan Lewis" to "Phillip Daniel . .
Bernhard, Changes Allowed in Trial Record, San Francisco Call-Bulletin, reproduced
in appendix to CHEssmAN, TRAL By ORDEAL (1955).
7. The trial judge, in compliance with CAL. R. oN App'. 35(c), certified that "the
objections made to the transcript herein have been heard and determined and the
same is now corrected in accordance with such determination . . . and the same
'is now, therefore, approved by me." People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 459, 218
P.2d 769, 771 (1950).
8. People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769 (1950).
9. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
10. At this proceeding the court ordered approximately 2000 changes to be made.
Some of these changes were ordered in the part of the transcript prepared by the
original reporter as well as in the part prepared by the substitute reporter. The
court then made approximately 90 changes, generally resulting from clerical errors
in the list of changes ordered, without notice or hearing. The California Supreme
Court held that these last 90 changes, which in effect were an amendment to the
court's original order, had to be determined upon a hearing at which Chessman was
present. Chessman v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 835, 330 P.2d 225 (1958). There-
after, Chessman stipulated to 26 of the 90 changes but continued to object to the
remaining 64. At a re-settlement hearing on the 64 changes, again with Chessman and
his counsel present, the superior court disallowed the objections to the changes and
ruled that they should stand. On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's finding that the 2000 changes in no way affected "'the substance
and nature of either the People's case or the defendant's defense.'" Id. at 840, 330
P.2d at 227.
11. People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 341 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 361 U.S.
U.S. 925 (1959).
A. The Adequacy of the Transcript
When the California Supreiae Court initially examined the Chess-
man transcript in 1950, it conceded that the transcript was not a
"verbatim record of every word that was said in the trial court." 1
2
This concession was realistic since the the transcription by a substi-
tute reporter of over twelve hundred pages of reporter's notes,
which in the opinion of some court reporters were indecipherable, 3
undoubtedly resulted in some inaccuracies. The court, however,
took the position that while the transcript was imperfect, it was
adequate to permit a just and fair disposition of the appeal on its
merits. The court offered some substantiation for its position by
pointing out that in normal circumstances where a reporter lives to
transcribe his own notes, the certificate which he is required to sign
-that the "transcript is correct" -is no more than a certification
that the "transcript is correct to the best of the particular reporters
and the transcriber's abilities."14 The court also observed that the
minimum statutory dictation-speed requirement for court reporters
in California does not insure altogether complete and accurate tran-
scripts 15 and that Chessman's transcript was possibly as accurate
and complete as one produced in normal circumstances.
The court's position that the transcript was adequate may have
initially been open to the normal doubt encountered when a court
determines a factual issue against an appellant. Subsequent con-
sideration of the transcript issue by various courts, however, dis-
pelled substantially all of the doubts which at one time may have
existed. After the 1950 decision by the California Supreme Court,
12. People v. Chessman, 85 Cal. 2d 455, 461, 218 P.2d 769, 772 (1950).
18. On September 16, 1948, when the appointment of the substitute stenographer
was under consideration, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Los
Angeles Superior Court Reporters' Association wrote the Board of Supervisors
respecting the matter, as follows: 'We believe the purported charge against
the county . . . will reflect further adverse publicity upon our group because
we have serious doubts that any reporter will be able to furnish a usable tran-
script of said shorthand notes. Other reporters of our number have examined
and studied Mr. Perry's notes and have reached the conclusion that many por-
tions of the same will be found completely indecipherable because, toward the
latter part of each court session, Mr. Perrys notes show his illness. We feel
that this should be brought to your attention."
Chessman v. Teets, 854 U.S. 156, 159 n.5 (1957).
14. People v. Chessman, 85 Cal. 2d 455, 461, 218 P.2d 769, 772 (1950).
15. 88 Stat. of Cal. 1082-88 (1909), in force at the time of the Chessman trial,
provided as a minimum standard for court reporters immediate transcription of
material dictated at the rate of 150 words per minute for five minutes. CAL. GovT.
CODE § 69948, presently in force, sets forth the same requirements.
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every federal court 1 and state court 17 which considered the issues
related to the transcript found the transcript to be adequate and to
have been competently prepared. This fact alone is virtual proof
that the record was adequate to permit a court to determine Chess-
man's claims. But other factors also tend to confirm the correctness
of the California courts' determination. For instance, many of the
changes which were requested and allowed were undoubtedly in-
significant and in themselves did not materially affect the substance
of the transcript. 8 The number of changes which the court al-
16. In Chessman v. Teets, 138 F. Supp. 761 (N.D. Cal. 1956), a federal district
court found that "shorthand reporter Perry [the original reporter] was not unable
to properly record the trial proceedings .... " and that "Fraser [the substitute re-
porter] was exceptionally and specially competent to transcribe Perry's notes and
did so with fairness and competently." Id. at 765.
17. After the California Supreme Court had found the transcript adequate for
a fair appellate review on Chessman's appeal on that issue, People v. Chessman, 35
Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769, cert. denied, 840 U.S. 840 (1950), the court reconsidered
the problem when Chessman made his appeal on the merits. People v. Chessman, 38
Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1952). The Cali-
fornia court said: "Re-examination of these arguments [Chessman's arguments that
the transcript was inadequate] and of the transcript leaves us convinced that the
transcript permits a fair consideration and disposition of the appeaL" Id. at 172,
238 P.2d at 1005.
In a subsequent proceeding which convened on November 25, 1957, and which
continued for forty-two days until February 14, 1958, Judge Evans of the Los
Angeles superior court found "that the shorthand notes of Mr. Perry were decipher-
able and that Mr. Frazier [sic] was competent and qualified to transcribe and did
so transcribe those notes fairly and in a substantially accurate manner. . . ." Chess-
man v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 835, 839, 330 P.2d 225, 227 (1958). After the
California Supreme Court bad remanded the case for further proceedings to deter-
mine alleged errors, Chessman again appealed to the California Supreme Court.
Once again the court concluded that "the corrected reporter's transcript is sub-
stantially accurate and sufficiently complete in every respect to permit a fair review
of the appeal from the judgments of conviction. People v. Chessman, 52 Cal.
2d 467, 489, 341 P.2d 679, 692 (1959).
18. See note 6 supra for examples of some of the changes allowed in the transcript.
It should be remembered that some of these changes may not be as radical or sig-
nificant when they are placed in context as they seem to be when nakedly stated.
The fact that the court in 1958 allowed approximately 2000 changes in the transcript
and that it could then hold that these changes did not alter the substance of the
Chessman defense, People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 341 P.2d 679 (1959), is
evidence that the changes Chessman pressed were of little substance.
Furthermore, Chessman probably made some invalid requests for changes. For
instance, in his first attack on the record, People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218
P.2d 769 (1950), Chessman asserted that the record was mistaken in "showing that
he did not cross-examine certain witnesses." Id. at 463, 218 P.2d at 774. The court
determined that this contention was unfounded, not only on the grounds of con-
trary testimony by the substitute reporter and of the notes taken by the trial judge,
but also on the ground of the contrary testimony of the deputy public defender who
acted as Chessman's legal advisor during the trial.
Similarly, Chessman contended that the trial judge, on May 21, when the jury
returned for further instructions, told them that Chessman "was one of the worst
criminals he had had in his court, and that the jury should bring in the death pen-
alty. " People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467 ,488, 341 P.2d 679, 692 (1959).
The federal district court, however, determined that Chessman's allegation was "false
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lowed '" also becomes less impressive when it is realized that these
changes were made in a transcript of over two thousand pages. Nor
does the fact that a substitute reporter transcribed the notes neces-
sarily lead to the conclusion that the transcript was inadequate. 0
Since a number of shorthand symbols do not represent only one
word,21 a reporter who has taken notes of extensive testimony may
not produce an altogether complete and accurate record even when
he transcribes his own notes.22 Furthermore, it is not an unprece-
dented procedure for a substitute reporter to prepare a transcript
from another reporter's notes.2 3 In the Chessman litigation the tran-
scription by a substitute reporter is less significant because upon at
least one other occasion the original and substitute reporters had
worked together.24
and perjurious" and that the "trial judge made no such statement." Chessman v.
Teets, 138 F. Supp. 761, 765-66 (N.D. Cal. 1956). When Chessman again raised
the charge before Judge Evans in the Los Angeles superior court in the 1958-1959
hearing, the court also found the allegation to be a "figment of the defendants
imagination which was conceived several years after the time of his trial ....
Appendix I, People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 488, 341 P.2d 679, 692 (1959).
Also see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Chessman v. Teets, 354
U.S. 156 (1957), in which he asserts that "it is impossible to conclude that there is
any important, significant prejudicial error in the record. Id. at 167.
19. See notes 4 & 10 supra.
20. Although it was the original contention of the Chairman of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Los Angeles Superior Court Reporters' Association that portions of the
notes were "indecipherable," see note 13 supra, there was a sharp conflict of opin-
ion in the 1958-59 hearing as to whether the notes were sufficiently legible to permit
transcription. Chessman presented expert witnesses who testified that the notes were
not legible. The state, on the other hand, presented experts who testified that the
notes were legible and adequate to prepare a record. In light of this confliction
evidence, it was within Judge Evan's province to resolve the issue in favor of the
state.
21. During the 1958-59 hearing, an expert witness presented by Chessman, dem-
onstrated this point by writing:
a symbol which represents pawn, pin,, pine," "upon, "pain, pane,
pen, pun, open,, punih," or "happen" and which "By closing this little
n hook" represents "pawns, pins, pines, pin his, 'pin us, "pawn his,"
"pawn us," "pence," "pains," "opens," "pounce, ""punishes," "punishment,"
"punish his," "punish us."
People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 487 n.9, 341 P.2d 679, 691 n.9 (1959).
22. It is an inevitable conclusion that if a competent court reporter takes the
testimony of a witness who speaks rapidly and if that reporter does not transcribe
his notes for several days, the record he will produce will not be perfect. Al-
though he will be able to rely on his recollection of what occurred, at trial to a
certain extent, he will be chiefly dependent upon his notes. Since each note-symbol
can mean various things, see note 21 supra, his position is not too different from
that of a substitute reporter inasmuch as he will be unable to reconstruct exactly what
happened.
23. In People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 341 P.2d 679 (1959), the court said:
"The preparation of a transcript by a substitute reporter is not unprecedented; the
evidence at the resettlement hearings discloses that in other cases one court reporter
has transcribed another's shorthand notes." Id. at 486, 341 P.2d at 690.
24. "[lit appears that in 1945 Perry [the deceased reporter] transcribed Fraser's
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Although Chessman persisted in asserting that the transcript of
his trial was inadequate, he was unable to point to specific, preju-
dicial error in the record. There were, of course, circumstances
which cast some doubt on the accuracy of the transcript and which
Chessman utilized effectively to create and to perpetuate doubt
concerning the transcript's adequacy.25 But since an adequate tran-
script is not synonomous with a perfect transcript, it is proper for a
court to set a standard for adequacy based upon the appellant's
need for bringing certain matter before the court in any particular
case. It was this function which the California courts performed.
Thus, it seems not unfair to accept as sound the California courts'
position that the Chessman transcript was adequate to permit a
fair appellate review.
B. California Procedures
The California Supreme Court's determination of the adequacy
of the record was based upon Chessman's failure to prove prejudi-
cial error in the transcript. After the court in the first Chessman
appeal 26 had stated that in all appeals the defendant is presumed to
have been accorded a fair trial, it held that the appellant has the
burden of proving not only that there is error in the transcript but
that that error is consequential and prejudicial2 T Chessman was
unable to meet this burden. Thus, the initial problems which the
transcript controversy raises are whether the procedures employed
by the California courts to determine adequacy of the transcript
were consistent with California precedent and whether they con-
stitute sound judicial practice.
Until 1943 California provided that an appeal should be made on
a narrative form record of the proceedings when death or disability
of the court reporter made transcription by the reporter taking the
notes impossible.28 As a result, controversies similar to that in the
notes of a two-week criminal trial held in 1932; Fraser thereafter examined the
transcript which Perry had prepared and found it 'very true and accurate'." Ibid.
25. Such circumstances as the death of the original court reporter, the appoint-
ment of a relative of the prosecutor as a substitute reporter, and the number of
changes allowed by the courts were all employed by Chessman to create doubt con-
cerning the accuracy of the transcript.
26. People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769 (1950).
27. The court in People v. Chessman, supra note 26, said: "Inconsequential inac-
curracies or omissions in a record cannot prejudice a party; if in truth there does
exist some consequential inaccuracy or omission, the appellant must show what it is
and why it is consequential." Id. at 462, 218 P.2d 773.
28. In 1909, the legislature of California enacted § 1247 b of the Penal Code which
provided that:
if a transcription of the phonographic reporter's notes can not be obtained, by
reason of his illness or death, the appellant shall cause to be prepared and filed,
in the place thereof, a transcription of such of the proceedings as was by the
court ordered to be transcribed by the phonographic reporter.
In 1928, Sup. Ct. Rule II § 9 was adopted and provided that:
[Vol. 44:941
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Chessman case did not arise. However, in cases where portions of
the record were lost or destroyed and where a complete record was
impossible to obtain, the California court has almost consistently
placed the burden of showing prejudicial error on the appellant and
in the absence of such showing has denied new trials.2 9 Similarly,
if a transcription of the phonographic reporter's notes cannot, for any reason,
be obtained, the appellant shall cause to be prepared and filed, in the place
thereof, a statement of such of the proceedings as were or shall be ordered by
the court to be transcribed.
This procedure remained in force until the present Rules on Appeal were adopted in
1948. Rules on Appeal 36(b) provides:
If a transcription of any part of the oral proceedings cannot be obtained for
any reason, the appellant, as soon as the impossibility of obtaining a transcript
is discovered, may serve and fie an application for permission to prepare a
settled statement thereof.
As Justice Edmonds stated in his dissenting opinion, a settled statement under Rule
86 could be used only upon Chessman's request. The majority, on the other hand,
took the position that the Rules on Appeal were not meant to change so radically
the former rules so as to relieve the appellant of furnishing a statement on appeal.
The court stated that where literal compliance with the rules became impossible
without fault of anyone, it should inquire "whether there is or can be made avail-
able a record on which [the] . . . court can perform its function of reviewing..
People v. Chessman, 85 Cal. 2d 455, 460, 218 P.2d 769, 772 (1950).
29. In People v. Botkin, 9 Cal. App. 244, 98 Pac. 861 (1908), the court said:
It is now urged that because the entire record cannot now be presented to this
court, we should reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. No
authority is cited in support of this position, and we know of none that could be.
It is incumbent on the appellant to show error, and we know of no rule that
permits us to presume that defendant did not have a fair trial because a portion
of the record upon her appeal has been destroyed without fault of either party.
Id. at 249, 98 Pac. at 864. Also see, Diamond v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. 732, 210
Pac. 36 (1922) (reporter died before transcribing notes); Visher v. Webster, 13
Cal. 8 (1859) (instructions given by the court were lost or mislaid); Cooper v. Supe-
rior Court, 12 Cal. App. 2d 336, 55 P.2d 299 (1936) (instructions given at trial
were destroyed and court reporter neglected to record them).
In Snell v. Neilson, 50 Cal. App. 27, 194 Pac. 530 (1920), the District Court of
Appeals of California of the Third District said that "where, as here, the record of
the trial or any substantial portion thereof has been, before it has been properly
made up for the purpose of an appeal, and without any fault of the party against
whom judgment has gone, lost or destroyed, a new trial should be granted." Id. at
32, 194 Pac. at 532. However, the decision in the Snell case was not held to be
authority on this point in Diamond v. Superior Court, supra.
A problem similar to the one where full records are unavailable is raised in the
situation where the record is not authenticated in accordance with the applicable
statute or rule. In cases such as these the California courts have consistently dis-
missed the appeal. While Chessman himself seemed to have relief upon early cases in
which California courts refused to consider records on appeal because they lacked
proper authentication, (see People v. Martin, 32 Cal. 91 (1867); People v. Lee, 97
Cal. App. 321, 275 Pac. 815 (1929); Lewis v. Lapique, 26 Cal. App. 448, 147 Pac.
221 (1915) (civil case); People v. Brecker, 20 Cal App. 205, 127 Pac. 666 (1912);
People v. Schultz, 14 Cal. App. 106, 111 Pac. 271 (1910)), the problem raised by
these cases is not entirely analogous to the Chessman situation. These cases establish
the court's strict requirement of authentication, but they presuppose that an authen-
ticating official as provided by law was available and that the appellant could have
obtained a certification bad he attempted to do so. In such circumstances, where the
appellant has the responsibility of perfecting the appeal, the dismissal of the appeal
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under the present California Rules on Appeal, the court has con-
tinued to place the burden of proving prejudicial inaccuracies in the
record on the appellant. 0
When the burden of proving error in the record is placed upon
the appellant, he may in some circumstances be faced with serious
problems of proof. A series of inaccuracies and omissions which al-
together could be prejudicial might well be difficult to prove
singly.31 The appellant will most likely be faced with this problem
when he asserts that the evidence does not support the verdict and
that certain impeachment testimony or contradictory testimony has
been misstated or omitted. It is arguable that the court is in no po-
sition to consider the evidence when it has before it an incomplete
record. However, when the record contains evidence which sup-
ports the jury's finding, the fact that that evidence was contradicted
or that the witness was impeached is of no real significance since the
court cannot reverse a judgment merely because it disagrees with
the weight a jury may have given to certain evidence.$2 Further-
can at least logically be justified on the basis of the appellant's laches. These cases
can be distinguished on the ground that Chessman was not at fault in failing to
comply with the Rules on Appeal. If the Court were to bind itself to a formal
argument based on these cases to its logical conclusion without considering the
absence of fault on Chessman's part, the result would be the dismissal of the appeal
or the affirming of the judgment without passing on the merits of the appeal. Such
a grossly unjust result is, of course, unthinkable and was rejected by the court.
30. See People v. Fuentes, 132 Cal. App. 2d 484, 282 P.2d 524 (1955), a case in
which part of the reporter's notes were lost. The court placed the burden on the
defendant "of showing either prejudicial error in the record or that the record is so
inadequate that he is unable to show such error." Id. at 488, 282 P.2d at 527.
31. In People v. Chessman, 85 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769 (1950), Justice Edmonds,
in a dissenting opinion, wrote:
It is unreasonable to place upon a defendant sentenced to death the burden of
showing wherein omissions and inaccuracies in the record vitally affect his
rights. This is particularly true of the evidence in the present case relating to the
question of identification. .. .It may be that if the missing testimony were
presented upon the appeal, Chessman's guilt would not be so clearly established
as to enable this court to say that such errors as may be relied upon as grounds
for reversal did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
Id. at 473, 218 P.2d at 779.
32. The California Supreme Court, in People v. Schafer, 198 Cal. 717, 247 Pac.
576 (1926), has summarized its position as follows:
It is the function of the jury in the first instance to determine what facts are
established, and before a verdict which has been accepted by the trial court,
and subsequently approved on motion for a new trial, can be set aside on appeal
upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, it must be made to appear
that upon no hypothesis is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the
conclusion reached in the court below.
Id. at 720-21, 247 Pac. at 577. (Emphasis added.) As the court in People v. Chess-
man, 35 .Cal. 2d 463, 218 P.26 769 (1950), pointed out, Chessman did not contend
that the evidence in the transcript was not actually received at trial. The record
of the trial is replete with evidence establishing Chessman's guilt. Since the jury
obviously believed this evidence, the fact that they may have disregarded contradic-
tory or impeachment testimony not included in the record is not a ground for
granting a new trial.
more, there is questionable merit in allowing an appellant to assert
inaccuracy in the transcript while placing the burden of proving the
adequacy on the appellee or the state. Such procedure would in
effect cast upon the state or appellee the burden of proving the
entire transcript in cases where the appellant chose to put numerous
portions of the transcript in question by asserting frivolous claims of
error. Since a superior court can properly presume that the findings
of an inferior court are not in error, it is logical to place the burden
of proving inaccuracies on the appellant by presuming the correct-
ness of the finding of the trial court that the transcript reflects what
occurred at the proceedings. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to
require an appellant to present affidavits of the witnesses who testi-
fied at the trial to demonstrate that their testimony was materially
different from that appearing in the transcript.
A further problem concerning state procedures revolves about the
court's refusals to grant a new trial as a matter of course after the
death of the court reporter. The right of a new trial in a criminal
case is controlled in California by a statute which sets forth the
various grounds upon which a court may grant a new trial.3 3 The
impossibility of obtaining a transcript produced in strict compliance
with the Rules on Appeal is not one of those grounds. On the other
hand, California procedure allows a new trial at the discretion of,
the court in a civil case when the death or disability of the trial re-
porter renders a transcription by the original reporter impossible.34
While in numerous instances valid distinctions between civil and
criminal cases support differences in procedure, 35 the California
33. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181. The following grounds for granting a new trial are
among those provided: (1) absence of defendant from trial, (2) receiving of evi-
dence out of court by the jury, (3) misconduct of the jury, (4) deciding of verdict
by lot, (5) error in instruction of law to jury and prejudicial misconduct by the
prosecuting attorney, (6) verdict being contrary to law or evidence, (7) new evi-
dence discovered after the trial.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d
769 (1950), apparently regarded the seven enumerated grounds as exclusive.
34. CAL. Civ. Poc. § 953(e) provides:
When it shall be impossible to have a phonographic report of the trial
transcribed by a stenographic reporter as provided by law or by rule, because of
the death or disability of a reporter who participated as a stenographic reporter
at the trial, or because of the loss or destruction, in whole or in substantial part,
of the notes of such reporter, the court or a judge thereof shall have power to
set aside and vacate the judgment, order or decree from which an appeal has
been taken or is to be taken and to order a new trial of the action or proceeding.
It has been held in Caminetti v. Edward Brown & Sons, 23 Cal. 2d 511, 144 P.2d
570 (1944), that the granting of a new trial under this statute is discretionary with
the court so that even if Chessman's case had come under this statute or a comparable
one, it does not necessarily follow that he would be given a new trial as a matter
of right.
35. The nature of a criminal case is such that certain procedures are required.
For instance, the grand jury procedure, the indictment and the information are
procedures which are expedient in criminal cases. However, they would be virtually
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practice is based on an arbitrary distinction. When it is considered
that property as well as social position, freedom, and life itself are
often involved in a criminal action, there is little justification for the
distinction which California has drawn. Although California has
the power to grant new trials in civil cases but to deny them in
criminal cases in the same circumstances, there is little doubt but
that the cost of an added safeguard of a new trial would be small
when compared with the greater certainty which it would afford.3,
While the merits of the California system may be subject to at-
tack, the system cannot be said to have worked an injustice in the
Chessman case. The repeated examinations by the state and federal
courts of the issues concerning the transcript and the consistent
resolution against Chessman on all of his claims lend support to the
proposition that the transcript was adequate. The validity of Chess-
man's convictions is no more questionable because of the transcript
controversy than in many cases in which convictions hinge upon
a factual determination by judicial machinery and in which the con-
victed man continues to maintain that he is innocent. It must be ad-
mitted that finality in the area of the transcript controversy was
attained only after extended litigation of this issue which caused great
expense to the state, hardship to Chessman, and in many instances
unfortunate publicity to the state's legal system. Thus, even though
Chessman was given every right which California accords to any
person in his situation, and even though the transcript was ade-
quate, it is possible, with the advantage of hindsight, to argue
that expediency alone should have dictated the granting of a new
trial. But expediency is not in all instances equated with sound ju-
dicial practice. The California practice of denying a new trial in
a criminal case once the transcript has been found to be adequate
is neither aberrant nor of such a nature that reasonable men could
not agree on its wisdom. It cannot be denied that requiring an ap-
peal on an adequate but imperfect transcript may in the majority of
cases result in justice being done more readily than if a new trial
were to be granted. Since California has established and adhered to
the practice that no new trial should be given when an adequate
useless in a civil case. Similarly, such procedures as discovery procedures under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the pleading procedures of civil cases could not
be used in criminal cases.
36. In People v. Fuentes, 132 Cal. App. 2d 484, 282 P.2d 524 (1955), Presiding
Justice Shinn in a concurring opinion wrote:
I take this occasion to state my opinion that the inability of a defendant desiring
to appeal to obtain a reporter's transcript should be made a ground for granting
a new trial, as it is in a civil case. It is far better that a defendant be retried
than that the state should permit itself to be subject to the criticism that it has
denied an appellant a fair and adequate record on appeal.
Id. at 490, 282 P.2d at 528-29.
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record has been prepared, there would seem to be no reason to have
made an exception in the Chessman case simply because protracted
litigation would or did result from that practice.
C. Due Process
The second major problem involved in the controversy concerning
the Chessman transcript is whether Chessman was denied due
process of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the
federal constitution. In relation to matters involving preparation
and settlement of the transcript, the United States Supreme Court
held that Chessman's charges of fraud in preparation of the tran-
script, if proved true, would be a denial of due process,37 and that
the ex parte settlement of the record violated Chessman's constitu-
tional right to procedural due process.38 The Supreme Court by
denying certiorari declined to pass on other issues relating to the
transcript.3 9 However, the possibility that there have been violations
of constitutional rights is not foreclosed by the Court's repeated
denials of certiorari. 40 The basic issue left unresolved by the Su-
preme Court is the constitutionality of requiring Chessman to make
his appeal on a transcript prepared by a substitute reporter instead
of granting a new trial when the original court reporter had died.41
87. Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 8 (1955). It was Chessman's contention that the
transcribing reporter and the prosecuting attorney had connived to alter the tran-
script. After the lower federal court dismissed the petition because it did not present
a federal question, Chessman v. Teets, 128 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Cal. 1955), and the
court of appeals had affirmed, 221 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1955), the United States
Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and held that "the charges of fraud as such
set forth constitute a denial of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 350 U.S. at 3-4. Upon remand, the federal district court found that
Chessman had failed to sustain the allegations of his petition and, therefore, dis-
charged the writ. Chessman v. Teets, 138 F. Supp. 761 (N.D. Cal.) aff'd, 239 F.2d
205 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
38. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
39. The Supreme Court denied certiorari six times: 340 U.S. 840 (1950); 841
U.S. 929 (1951); 43 U.S. 915 (1952); 846 U.S. 916 (1958); 848 U.S. 864 (1954);
861 U.S. 925 (1959).
40. But see the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas in Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156
(1957), in which he states that his "dissent is based on the conviction that, in sub-
stance, the requirements of due process have been fully satisfied, that to require
more is to exalt a technicality." Id. at 167.
41. It is arguable that when the United States Supreme Court held that the
ex parte settlement of the record was a denial of due process, Chessman v. Teets,
354 U.S. 156 (1957), it was recognizing the propriety of requiring an appellant to
make his appeal on a transcript prepared by a substitute reporter. This argument is
based on the assumption that the Court would not have required California to hold
settlement hearings on a transcript which did not and would not meet due process
requirements. Although this position has merit and is generally convincing, it is
arrived at only by reading meaning into an area where the Court in effect has denied
certiorari by limiting its writ of certiorari to Chessmans right to be represented
at the settlement proceedings. This interpretation of the meaning of a denial of a
writ of certiorari is, of course, a practice conjectural in nature and consistently
condemned by the Court. See Brown v. Allen, 844 U.S. 443 (1958).
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Shortly after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment the Su-
preme Court held that due process of law does not include the
right of an appeal in criminal cases.42 The Court has, however, in
practice departed from this early position, and it is now generally
recognized that due process requirements are applicable to crim-
inal appellate review. 3 Because a record of the trial is essential to
any appeal, it logically follows that standards of due process are
applicable to the preparation and adequacy of the transcript on
which an appeal is made.44 The Supreme Court has in the past only
infrequently dealt with due process requirements in the area of
criminal appellate review. 45 The Court has not laid down with any
42. In 1894, in McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894), the Court explicitly
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require a state
to give a right of review in criminal cases because such a right had not been accorded
at common law. The Court concluded that if a state gave a right of review, it could
do so "upon such terms as in its wisdom may be deemed proper." Id. at 688. Also
see National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954) (civil
action); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S.
155 (1900); Kohl v. Lehlbach, 160 U.S. 293 (1895); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S.
272 (1895).
43. Although the Court has continued to pay lip-service to the position that due
process does not require a right of appeal in criminal cases, it has in reality modified
its position by holding that the proceedings on appeal are part of the process of law
and must, therefore, meet the constitutional requirements established by the due
process clause. See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309, 327 (1915).
44. The Court's continued reference to the McKane case has, however, caused
some uncertainty. For instance, in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the Court, said:
It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide
appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. See, e.g., McKane v. Dur-
ston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-688. But that is not to say that a State that does grant
appellate review can do so in any way that discriminates against some convicted
defendants on account of their poverty. Appellate review has now become an
integral part of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or
innocence of a defendant. Consequently, at all stages of the proceedings the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from
invidious discrimination.
Id. at 18. The Court's statement in the Griffin case is open to two interpretations:
(1) The reference to due process coupled with the reference to equal protection
might mean that the due process clause will not allow inequality. Insofar as the
sentence also refers to "invidious discrimination," it is possible to assume that the
Court meant to use the term only as referring to a standard of uniformity in applying
a procedure, not as referring to any standard of intrinsic fairness. In short, it may
have referred to due process as affording only as much protection in this case as the
equal protection clause. Or (2) it can be read as being independent of the reference
to the equal protection clause, thus requiring a standard of fairness above that of
uniform treatment. The latter interpretation is reasonable in light of the holdings in
such cases as Frank v. Mangum, supra note 43.
45. Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955), is an example of the United States
Supreme Court's extending due process requirements to state post-conviction proced-
ures. Also see Griffin v. United States, 851 U.S. 12 (1956).
Since the Court has probably extended due process requirements to cover criminal
appellate procedure, the standards in this area will in the future be defined through
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exactness the requirements imposed by the due process clause in
relation to what constitutes an adequate record on appeal. Similarly,
the Court has not defined due process requirements in relation to
what exact procedures are required in preparation of the reporters
transcript to insure its adequacy. However, despite the absence of
decree in this area, it is possible, on the basis of general concepts
of due process, to formulate certain principles by which the record
used and the procedures employed in the Chessman litigation may
be judged. Since at common law there was no right of appeal as it
is known today,40 history and tradition are of little, if any, assistance
in determining due process requirements. The standards of due
process applicable to records on appeal must, therefore, be estab-
lished by determining what practices are in accordance with "funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice." 4
If appellate review-the purpose of which is to correct errors
made at trial-is one of the processes which is due, a minimal
standard for a record must certainly be that it be adequate to permit
an examination of any alleged error in the proceedings. Anything
less than a standard of such adequacy would be tantamount to a
failure to accord a full hearing since the alleged error to be reviewed
may have precluded a proper hearing at trial. There is little doubt,
therefore, that an appeal on an inadequate record would be a viola-
tion of fundamental justice and fairness.48 Since the California Su-
a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for
decision shall require." Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
46. In England appeals as we know them today were not generally afforded in
criminal cases until the passage of the Criminal Appeals Act in 1907. There were
available before that time such processes as the writ of error which afforded a means
of review by royal discretion of alleged errors apparent upon a limited record in
convictions for felonies. See Ozi ,u, CNnA.L AxPnExs 3n Am cA 14-31 (1939).
47. The Court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), observed that to
hold the historical test to be exclusive or to be the only test of due process "would
be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress
or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness
attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians." Id. at 529.
In dealing with the due process clause, courts have used various terms to express
the nebulous meaning of "concepts of fundamental liberty and justice." The follow-
ing quotations are examples of the general vagueness of the terms which courts
have employed: "certain fundamental rights, which that system of jurisprudence of
which ours is a derivative, has always recognized," Brown v. Levee Con'rs, 50
Miss. 468, 479 (1874), quoted in Hurtado v. California, supra at 536; "principles
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); "those general
rules established in our system of jurisprudence for the security of private rights,"
Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); and "those principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,"
Hurtado v. California, supra at 535.
48. Although the United States Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that a
record must be adequate in Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955), it did hold that
a fraudulently prepared transcript was a denial of due process. A transcript fraudu-
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preme Court found that the Chessman transcript was adequate to
permit a fair appellate review and since this decision was reasonably
supported by the facts surrounding the preparation and settlement
of the transcript, it is reasonable to assume that the substantive
requirements of due process insofar as they relate to the adequacy
of the Chessman transcript were met.
However, even when a transcript is adequate to allow a fair
appellate review, the possibility remains that certain procedures
in producing the transcript are of such a nature that the possibility
of error in the transcript becomes so great that these procedures
are a violation of due process. Therefore, in the Chessman litigation,
the further question of whether the procedures employed by the
California courts to settle the transcript on which the appeals were
made rather than allowing Chessman a new trial is a denial of due
process is raised.
Presumably, the procedures which the United States Supreme
Court has in the past indicated may be proper are in consonance
with concepts of fundamental justice and fairness and therefore
meet due process standards. The fact that the Court has indicated
that it is proper in some circumstances for an appeal to be made
on something other than a transcript of the oral proceedings indi-
cates that at present a transcript is not absolutely necessary in order
to meet due process requirements.49 The Court has expressly ap-
proved of a record of the trial court proceedings in a narrative
lently prepared would result in an inadequate transcript. Thus it can be said that
the Court's holding rests on the basic proposition that a transcript must be adequate
to permit a fair appellate review.
49. The Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) said:
We do not hold, however, that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript
in every case where a defendant cannot buy it. The Supreme Court may find
other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent
defendants. For example, it may be that bystanders' bills of exceptions or other
methods of reporting trial proceedings could be used in some cases.
Id. at 20. Also see Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 192 (1942), where the Court,
in speaking about the preparation of a bill of exceptions, said:
Historically a bill of exceptions does not embody a verbatim transcript of the
evidence but, on the contrary, a statement with respect to the evidence adequate
to present the contentions made in the appellate court. Such a bill may be
prepared from notes kept by counsel, from the judge's notes, from the recollec-
tion of witnesses as to what occurred at the trial and, in short, from any and all
sources which will contribute to a veracious account of the trial judge's action
and the basis on which his ruling was invoked.
Id. at 198. Similarly, in Herring v. Kennedy-Herring Hardware Co., 261 F.2d
202 (6th Cir. 1958), a civil case, it was said:
Although a stenographic transcript of the evidence is the usual way at the
present time in which a review of the evidence and alleged errors therein is
presented to the Court of Appeals, it is not the only way in which such a review
can be obtained. A satisfactory record, including a narrative statement of the
testimony of witnesses, may at times be prepared through the use of notes taken
during the trial by the attorneys and the trial judge, supplemented by memories
1960] NOTE
form.50 If a record which consists of a statement of the case as it is
agreed to by the parties or as it is prepared from the trial judge's
notes or from testimony taken from witnesses who testified at the
trial meets the requirements of due process, it would seem that an
appeal on a settled reporter's transcript found to be adequate to
permit a fair appellate review would also in that respect conform to
due process requirements.
Likewise, the procedures established by the Supreme Court for
the lower federal courts indicates that the Court considers the prac-
tice of requiring an appeal on a transcript settled by a trial judge
to be fair and just.51 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
relate to preparation of a record and which are incorporated into
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 52 provide that the district
court shall settle any difference as to whether the record accurately
discloses what occurred in the district court.53 In effect, this pro-
cedure is similar to the settlement procedure which has been
granted to Chessman when he was given opportunities to settle the
transcript. On this basis, therefore, it seems clear that the procedure
of the attorneys, witnesses, and the trial judge, by agreement between the parties,
and possibly from other sources.
Id. at 203.
50. In Miller v. United States, supra note 49, the Court said: "[O]ften it is
expedient and satisfactory to summarize the evidence and transmute it into narrative
form." Id. at 198. Again in Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957), the Court
approved of the narrative form of record when it said: "It is essential, however, that
he [petitioner] be assured some appropriate means - such as the district judge's notes
or an agreed statement by the trial counsel-of making manifest the basis of his
claim.... Id. at 566.
There are, of course, circumstances in which a narrative of the trial court pro-
ceedings may not serve to present the type of record necessary to pass upon the
petitioner's allegations of error. A common situation would arise when the petitioner
asserts that the verdict was not supported by the evidence. A transcript in this situa-
tion is almost imperative. However, an adequate but imperfect transcript may be
sufficient to allow examination of the petitioner's contention that the verdict cannot
be sustained by the evidence. If the transcript contains enough evidence which
could have been believed by the jury, the imperfect transcript allows adequate
review of the question of the sufficiency of the evidence. See note 32 supra and
accompanying text.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3772 provides: "The Supreme Court of the United States shall
have the power to prescribe . . . rules of practice and procedure with respect to any
or all proceedings after verdict. . . in criminal cases . . . in the United States
district courts . . . in the United States courts of appeals . . . and in the Supreme
Court of the United States."
52. FED. R. Cnm. P. 39(b) provides: "The rules and practice governing the
preparation and form of the record on appeal in civil actions shall apply to the
record on appeal in all criminal proceedings .
53. FED. R. Cxv. P. 75(h) provides:
It is not necessary for the record on appeal to be approved by the district
court or judge thereof . . . but, if any difference arises as to whether the record
truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the difference shall be sub-
mitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth.
See, e.g., Handford v. United States, 249 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1957).
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employed by California in settling a transcript and denying a new
trial when an adequate transcript could be prepared meets stand-
ards of due process.
Another possible measure for determining due process require-
ments can be the practices presently employed by state and federal
courts. Concededly, a procedure in effect in a majority of state and
federal courts does not of itself necessarily establish conclusively a
standard of due process. Nevertheless, the Court, in determining due
process requirements, will probably give weight to the fact that a
substantial number of courts regard a procedure as fair and just.52
A number of jurisdictions have passed upon the question of whether
a new trial should be granted when a transcript of the oral pro-
ceedings cannot be produced by the reporter taking the notes
because of his death or disability. The problem presented by the
death of the court reporter is that the appellant, through no fault
of his own, is forced to make his appeal on a reporter's transcript
which is prepared by a reporter who must rely solely on the notes
taken without the aid of recollection of what occurred at the trial.54
The fact, therefore, that a number of states allow a new trial when
the court reporter dies before he transcribes his notes 5 5 while a
substantial number of other jurisdictions deny a new trial in the
same circumstances 56 is significant.5 7 If the Court should follow the
54. The problem has arisen in civil as well as in criminal cases, but there would
seem to be no significant reason for distinguishing between the two on this basis.
If there is a distinction to be made, the situation arising in a capital criminal case
would seem to require a new trial more urgently than would a civil case.
A similar situation arises when the appellate procedure requires a bill of exceptions
and when the bill cannot be settled by the trial judge because of his death or
disability. See, e.g., J. W. Ripey & Son v. Art Wall Paper Mill, 27 Okla. 600, 112
Pac. 119 (1910). The problem is generally academic today because most states have
either abolished the formal bill of exceptions or provided by statute that the judge's
successor has the power to settle the bill.
55. See, e.g., State v. Bess, 31 La. Ann. 191 (1879); Elliott v. State, 5 Okla. Grim.
63, 113 Pac. 213 (1911); Little v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 164, 97 S.W.2d 479 (1936).
56. See, e.g., People v. Fuentes, 132 Cal. App. 2d 484, 282 P.2d 524 (1955);
State v. Thompson, 130 Mo. 438, 32 S.W. 975 (1895); Lidgerwood Mfg. Co. v.
Rogers, 24 Jones & Sp. 350, 4 N.Y. Supp. 716 (Super. Ct. 1889); State v. Evans, 145
Wash. 4, 258 Pac. 845 (1927).
Judge Medina, in United States v. Di Canio, 245 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1957), wrote:
There is no rule of thumb to govern the action of this court on an appeal from
a criminal conviction in those instances where the court stenographer who re-
ported the trial has died and another reporter has prepared the transcript from
stenographic notes. The absence of a completely accurate transcript does not,
without more, invalidate a conviction. A new trial will be ordered only if
necessary to the protection of a party's rights. Hence, the defects of the record
must be of a prejudicial character, not merely inconsequential inaccuracies or
omissions. Nor do we say any distinction is necessarily to be drawn between
civil and criminal appeals. Each case must stand on its own bottom; and the
outcome will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 715.
57. One of the more common reasons for not granting a new trial in these circum-
thinking in Wolf v. Colorado,5" in resolving this problem, it will re-
gard a new trial as only one of the remedies afforded to insure the
right of having an adequate transcript on appeal. It would seem,
therefore, that in light of such contrariety of views on whether to
grant a new trial in these circumstances, the Court will hesitate, if
not refuse, "to treat the remedy as an essential ingredient of the
right." 59
An explicit holding by the Court on the procedural and substan-
tive due process questions raised by the transcript controversy in
the Chessman case would have satisfactorily put to rest the conten-
tions that Chessman was denied constitutional rights. Yet despite
the absence of such decree there is little or no doubt but that Chess-
man was in fact accorded his full measure of due process. For while
the requirements of the federal constitution in the area of criminal
appellate procedure remain generally undefined, it is clear that on
the basis of general concepts of due process that Chessman has been
denied no constitutional rights in the matters relating to the prepa-
ration and adequacy of the transcript.
III. THE BIGHT TO COUNSEL AND SELF-REPRESENTATION
THE CouRT: Are you a good lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT CHESSmAN: I think so.
THE CouRT: Few lawyers say they are good.
THE DEFENDANT CaEssmAN: I think I am a good enough lawyer.
THE CoUnT: You don't want to trust it to a lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT CHEssmAN: I don't want to do it.
THE CouRT: What will probably happen, if we set this case down for
trial, you will want a lawyer and then ask for a continuance. If you want
to try your own case, there is no way we can tell you not to. You will have
to try it or have somebody hired to represent you in plenty of time to try
the case at the time it is set.
ThE DEFENDANTCEssmAN: I understand that.
THE CouRT: Because many times men with past experience such as you
have had - you know the tricks of the trade, and they get a lawyer at the
very last minute. You really want to try your own case?
Tim DEFENDArr CHEssMAN: That is correct.60
This colloquy took place forty-eight days prior to the beginning.
of Chessman's trial. As the court predicted, upon commencement
of the trial, Chessman, having had no formal legal training, ap-
stances is that the power to grant a new trial has been specially limited by statute
or by the constitution. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. For the purposes
of determining prevailing practices, however, it is of no significance whether the
granting or denying of the new trial is legislative or judicial in its origin.
58. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
59. Id. at 29.
60. Colloquy between Chessman and the trial court as reproduced in People v.
Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 466, 218 P.2d 769, 775 (1950).
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peared without counsel and moved for a continuance so he might
properly prepare his defense.61 The California Supreme Court af-
firmed the denial of the motion on the ground that Chessman's
decision to defend himself did not entitle him to any special privi-
leges and that his inability to interview witnesses and obtain law
books was a permissible consequence of this choice. 2 The court em-
phasized the fact that he had been forewarned that a continuance
would not be granted.6 3 Subsequent to the denial of this motion,
but prior to impaneling the jury, Chessman accepted the services
of the Deputy Public Defender provided that he would act solely
in the capacity of "legal adviser," and permit Chessman to conduct
his own defense. 64 Chessman did conduct his own defense, but the
trial Judge refused to allow him to approach either the jury box
during his preliminary examination of the jurors, or the witness
stand while he was interrogating witnesses.6 5
61. The principal ground upon which Chessman based his request for a continu-
ance was that he was unable to obtain necessary witnesses needed for the presenta-
tion of his case. In affirming the denial of the request, the California Supreme Court
said:
He says that a main point on which he will rely on appeal is that he was not
allowed to subpoena defense witnesses. The record before us shows that
defendant asked that two witnesses who resided out of the county be subpoenaed
and that the trial judge properly refused to order their attendance because de-
fendant's "Affidavit to substantiate necessity for issuance of foreign subpoenas"
affrmatively showed that the desired testimony of these witnesses . . . would
not have been admissible. . . . Defendant does not explain what other witnesses
he wished to call or what testimony he expected them to give. It appears that
three days before the trial the deputy district attorney, with defendant's consent,
gave to a deputy sheriff a list of 20 desired witnesses prepared by defendant
and instructed the sheriff to serve subpoenas on the listed persons. Twelve of
these people appeared and testified; two were served and their nonappearance
is not explained; two others were the above-mentioned persons who resided
out of the county; still another was present in court but did not testify. It
further appears that throughout the trial defendant had the services of Mr. Al
Mathews, deputy public defender, as "legal adviser" and the services of an
investigator for the public defender's office who interviewed 34 witnesses,
and subpoenaed some of them, for the defendant.
People v. Chessman, supra note 60, at 465-66, 218 P.2d at 775.
62. People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 174, 238 P.2d 1001, 1006 (1951). As
Chessman was confined in jail while awaiting trial, there is little doubt that he was
handicapped in trying to secure favorable witnesses and to prepare his defense.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Id. at 176, 238 P.2d at 1007. If these restraints were placed on Chessman after
he refused to accept court-appointed counsel, it could be argued that his decision
to defend himself was made without full knowledge of the handicaps under which
he would be forced to conduct his defense and hence vitiate the effectiveness of his
waiver of counsel. However, after the trial bad commenced, Chessman was quoted
as saying:
I wish to point out that it is my intention to act in propria persona at this time
and to continue to do so until such time as it is legally established that I am not
qualified to do so, and that I will not accept a court-appointed attorney.
Brief for Respondent, p. 3, Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957). Following this
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These facts raise the question whether Chessman was denied his
constitutional right to counsel.66
A. Right to Counsel During the Trial
The right to be represented by counsel when tried for a crime
in a federal court is provided by the sixth amendment which states
that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
* ' to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 6 7 The leading
decision interpreting the breadth of the sixth amendment's guaran-
tee is Johnson v. Zerbst,65 in which the Supreme Court stressed the
primary importance of the layman's right to be represented by le-
gally trained counsel. 9 The Court held that denial of the right to
statement, Chessman repeatedly affirmed his decision to conduct his own defense.
Ibid. Thus, there seems to be no validity to the claim that the restraints placed upon
Chessman nulified the effectiveness of his waiver.
66. Chessman's right to be represented by legal counsel was also in issue between
the time of conviction and the subsequent initial appeal. Following conviction by
the trial court, Chessman was sent to San Quentin Prison pending the outcome of
the automatic appeal provided by California law in all capital cases. See CAL. PEN.
CoD. § 1239(b). Because of the unexpected death of the court reporter and the
ensuing difficulties in transcribing the reporter's notes of the proceedings, hearings
were held for the purpose of settling the transcript. Although Chessman continued
to act as counsel in his own behalf, he Was not allowed to be personally present at
these hearings, nor was he represented by other counsel. Chessman v. Teets, 354
U.S. 156, 159-62 (1957). The United States Supreme Court held that in this in-
stance Chessman was denied the right to counsel under the due process clause of
.......ha.'u ,tn.g~ e'm-ent 1d- ±(fl2 .t -  ..zho-t o ......
iirea ne 'ngnt to 'dolmsei at the tiaime dr tne-fi ai, but cbnemaea tat tins.... .- .
did not extend to the settlement hearings. At this point, the Court directed
ia to hold further proceedings in relation to the transcript issue, the connota-
ng present that at all future proceedings Chessman was to be represented
x person or by counsel. It should be noted that in the resettlement hearings
)sequent to the above mentioned decisions, Chessman was personally present
represented by counsel. See Chessman v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 835,
) P.2d 225, 227 (1958). Thus it appears that although Chessman's right to
was violated by his not being represented at the original settlement hearings,
,ct was corrected.
CONST. amend. M. To implement this constitutional provision, Rule 44
ral Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Fendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of
to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the
igs unless he elects to proceed without counsel.
m. P. 44. Rule 5(a) provides that an accused be brought promptly before
ates Commissibner an. Ku'me ttr(6" provides tuat tfe C mm, sibner must
adant of his right to counsel and allow sufficient time to retain counsel.
development of the federal right to counsel, see Feliman,
o Counsel, 30 NEB. L. llxv. 559 (1951).
stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional
be lost, justice will not "still be done." It embodies a J
the obvious truth that the average defendant does not
legal skill to protect himself when brought before a
take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is pre-
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counsel precluded a federal court from obtaining jurisdiction over
the matter and rendered void any judgment it might enter.70 This
sixth amendment guarantee of right to counsel does not apply di-
rectly to state criminal prosecutions,7 ' but it has been held to apply
to state capital cases through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 2
The California Constitution also provides that an accused has the
sented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly and
necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex
and mysterious. Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and
other parts of our fundamental charter, this court has pointed to "... the hu-
mane policy of the modern criminal law..." which now provides that a
defendant i... f he be poor, . . .may have counsel furnished him by the
state . . .not infrequently .. .more able than the attorney for the state."
Id. at 462-63.
70.
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime
to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an
accused of his life or liberty. When this right is properly waived, the assistance
of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to proceed
to conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented by coun-
sel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right,
the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and
sentence depriving him of his life or liberty.
Id. at 467-68.
71. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444 (1940).
72. See, e.g., Quicksall v. Michigan, 839 U.S. 660 (1950); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the United State Supreme Court reversed the con-
victions of nine negro youths who had been sentenced to death for the rape of two
white girls. In the state prosecution, counsel was not appointed, and the defendants
were without legal assistance until the first day of the trial when a member of the
local bar volunteered to conduct the defense. The Supreme Court held that the
right to counsel in a capital case was a fundamental right guaranteed a defendant.
In explanation of why the right to counsel was so vitally important to a defendant,
the Court, through Mr. Justice Sutherland, said:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indict-
ment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incomplete evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inad-
missible.
Id. at 68-69. Powell is authority only in those situations where the defendant is
being tried for a capital offense. The Court concluded that:
even if opportunity had been given, to employ counsel, as the trial court evi-
dently did assume, we are of opinion that, under the circumstances just stated,
the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial
court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether this would
be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not
determine. All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a
capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness,
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right to be represented by counsel in a criminal prosecution.73 In
interpreting this constitutional mandate, the California courts have
held that the right to counsel extends to all state criminal prosecu-
tions in which the defendant may be deprived of his life or liberty,
including prosecutions for misdemeanors.74
It is quite clear that under the constitutions of both the United
States and the State of California Chessman had an absolute right
to be defended by counsel, and it is also clear that he could have
availed himself of this right had he desired to do so. But, it is like-
wise uniformly held that the right to counsel may be waived by a
defendant even in a capital case 75 if he is capable of appreciating
the gravity of his decision and no undue pressure is applied by the
prosecutor or the court to force the defendant's decision.78 The doc-
trine of waiver rests on the premise that it is as equally violative of
constitutional rights to force a defendant to accept counsel against
illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to
assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law.
Id. at 71.
Although certain dictum in Powell is subject to broad interpretation as to the role
of the federal courts in supervising state court right to counsel problems under the
due process clause, later decisions of the Supreme Court have limited the effect of
this dictum. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (due process not violated
in state robbery prosecution where custom of state was to appoint counsel for indi-
gent defendants only in capital cases); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) (no
denial of due process in capital case where counsel appointed two days preceding
trial and case vigorously defended and all appeals taken). But cf., Chandler v.
Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) (due process violated in situation where defendant
waived counsel in larceny trial unaware that conviction would carry life sentence
under habitual criminal statute).
For implications of the Powell case, see BEANY, THE Rir TO CoumsEr- m Am-
cAre CouRTs 151-61 (1955) and Fellman, The Federal Right to Counsel in State
Courts, 31 NEB. L. Rnv. 15, 16-20 (1951).
73. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8 provides that upon being brought before a magistrate,
a defendant must be told that he has a right to be represented by counsel. CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 13 provides that a defendant has the right "to appear and defend, in
person and with counsel." These provisions have been implemented by the California
Penal Code which describes in minute detail the procedures to be followed by the
courts in informing the accused of the nature of his crime and his right to counsel.
CAL. PEr. CODE § 858 provides that upon being brought before a magistrate after
arrest, the defendant must be informed of his right to be represented by counsel.
CAL. Pm. CODE § 987 provides that upon arraignment, if defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel, he must be informed of his right to have counsel appointed if he
cannot afford to hire counsel of his own choice, and wishes to be represented by
counsel. CAL. P'N. CODE § 1018 provides that a court may not accept a guilty plea
for a crime for which the maximum penalty is death, or life imprisonment without
possibility of parole, unless the defendant is represented by counsel.
74. See, e.g., In re Masching, 41 Cal. 2d 530, 261 P.2d 251 (1953).
75. See, e.g., Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Hoelscher v. Howard,
155 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1946); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (dictum);
People v. Ballentine, 39 Cal. 2d 193, 246 P.2d 35 (1952) (dictum).
76. In People v. Mimms, 110 Cal. App. 2d 310, 242 P.2d 331 (1951), the court
states that no pressure may be brought to bear on the defendant in order to persuade
him to waive his right to counsel.
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his express wishes as it is to force him to go to trial without the
benefit of counsel.7 7 In addition to refusing the services of counsel
several weeks before the commencement of the trial,7 Chessman
reiterated his decision to conduct his own defense some thirty-five
times during the course of the trial.TM Although initially Chessman
may have been unaware of the complexity of the legal issues con-
fronting him and the difficult problems in preparing his defense, it
is clear that during the course of the trial he was in a position to
appreciate fully the gravity of his decision. Thus, there is no justifi-
cation for the contention that he was not accorded his full constitu-
tional right to counsel at the trial.
B. Restraints During Trial
While conducting his defense, Chessman was not allowed the
freedom of the court room, but was restricted to the area of the
counsel table.80 He alleged that this restraint unduly hampered the
conduct of his defense and was favorable to the prosecuting attor-
ney who could move freely around the court room."' In rejecting the
contention that the action of the trial judge in restricting Chessman's
activity in the court room was prejudicial, the California Supreme
Court said:
In representing himself he retained this status [prisoner] and did not attain
that of an attorney at law who is an officer of the court and responsible
to it. Furthermore, the defendant had suffered previous convictions for
crimes of violence. Neither the presumption of innocence as a rule of proof
in relation to the crimes charged nor the elements of a fair trial under due
process required the court to conduct the trial proceedings oblivious to the
facts mentioned. Considerations for the safety and security of all persons
present in the courtroom, including the defendant, and for the judicial
process itself, justified the trial judge in feeling that it was unwise to allow
defendant to wander freely around the court room. 82
77. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 121 Mo. 514, 26 S.W. 345 (1894). In Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 296 (1942), in commenting upon the waiver
doctrine, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with a
lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that go to the
substance of an accused's position before the law. The public conscience must be
satisfied that fairness dominates the administration of justice. An accused must
have the means of presenting his best defense. He must have time and facilities
for investigation and for the production of evidence. But evidence and truth are
of no avail unless they can be adequately presented. Essential fairness is lacking
if an accused cannot put his case effectively in court. But the Constitution does
not force a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his Constitutional right to
assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open.
Id. at 279.
78. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
79. See Brief for Respondent, p. 3, Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).




It has long been the law in California that any action on the part
of the trial judge which unduly accentuates the fact that the defend-
ant is in custody and is possibly a dangerous person is likely to be
prejudicial in the eyes of the jury and should not be permitted. 3
Nevertheless, the California courts have indicated that certain re-
straints may be necessary in order that the trial judge may carry
out his responsibility of maintaining order and decorum in the court
room.8 Although it is difficult to extract from the cases a test which
may be applied in all situations to determine when a trial judge's
action in restraining a defendant is excessive, it is clear that the re-
straint employed should be of a type designed to prevent a threat-
ened disorder, and not punitive or vindictive in nature.85
83. In People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165 (1871), a defendant was brought into
the courtroom for trial in irons. On appeal, the record did not disclose any reason
why the manacles were necessary. In reversing the conviction, the court said:
In my opinion any order or action of the Court which, without evident necessity,
imposes physical burdens, pains, and restraints upon a prisoner during the
progress of his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his mental
faculties, and thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his consti-
tutional rights of defense; and especially would such physical bonds and re-
straints in like manner materially impair and prejudicially affect his statutory
privilege of becoming a competent witness and testifying in his own behalf.
Id. at 168.
84. See People v. David, 12 Cal. 2d 639, 86 P.2d 811 (1939); People v. Kimball,
5 Cal. 2d 608, 55 P.2d 483 (1936); People v. Deveny, 112 Cal. App. 2d 767, 247
P.2d 128 (1952); People v. Harris, 98 Cal. App. 2d 662, 220 P.2d 812 (1950);
In re Malone, 44 Cal. 2d 700, 284 P.2d 805 (1955) (dictum). Similarly, CAL. PEN.
CODE § 688 contains the following provision: "Nor can a person charged with a
public offense be subjected, before conviction, to any more restraint than is necessary
for his detention to answer the charge."
85. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128, 136 (8th Cir. 1937); State
v. Van Bogart, 85 Ariz. 63, 331 P.2d 597 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 973 (1959);
People v. Kimball, 5 Cal. 2d 608, 55 P.2d 483 (1936). In Eaddy v. People, 115
Colo. 488, 174 P.2d 717 (1946), the Colorado court reversed a conviction in a case
where defendant in a murder trial was forced to wear coveralls with "County Jail"
stenciled on them throughout the trial. The defendant was a soldier and the state
contended that if he were dressed in his uniform, the jury would be prejudiced in
his favor. In rejecting this contention, the court said:
We believe the mind of a prisoner would be as much disturbed and his mental
faculties as much confused and embarrassed by carrying on his person such
brand of incarceration, as here required, as by physical shackles, and that a
prejudice against a prisoner might equally well be created thereby in the minds
of the jurors.
The federal courts apply the same basic standard to determine the reasonableness
of any restraint placed on a defendant as do the California courts. See, e.g., DeWolf
v. Waters, 205 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 837 (1953); Blaine v.
United States, 136 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Seadlund v. United States, 97 F.2d
742, 748 (8th Cir. 1938). In Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 873 (1951), the standard was stated in the following manner:
Freedom from shackling and manacling of a defendant during the trial of a
criminal case has long been recognized as an important component of a fair and
impartial trial. ... Ordinarily such procedure should be permitted only to
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In determining whether the restraints placed on Chessman were
necessary in order to prevent a possible disorder in the court room,
it is relevant that he had a record of past convictions for crimes of
a violent nature.86 In addition, he was being trial for crimes which
because of their nature have a tendency to arouse public indigna-
tion. These factors could lead a trial judge to the conclusion that a
substantial risk existed that actions of the defendant, the witnesses
or the spectators could precipitate an outburst in the courtroom.
This is especially true since Chessman was conducting his own de-
fense. However, because he was defending himself, it is arguable
that any restraint which might have hampered the conduct of his
defense was unreasonable unless absolutely necessary. Since Chess-
man was relatively unfamiliar with proper court room technique,
any restraint on his movements might have lessened the effective-
ness of his presentation when compared to that of an experienced
prosecutor not hampered by similar restraints. Also, if the jury were
aware that the trial judge had ordered Chessman restrained, they
might have inferred that in the judge's opinion, the defendant was
guilty; this could have been very prejudicial. However, the fact that
Chessman only contended that the restraints hampered him in the
conduct of his defense,17 and not that the jury was prejudiced as to
his guilt leads to the inference that the jury was probably unaware
of the restraints.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is not difficult to reconstruct the
situation which faced the trial judge and conclude that his decision
to restrain Chessman was unnecessary. But, since a trial judge has
prevent the escape of the prisoner or to prevent him from injuring bystanders
and officers of the court or to maintain a quiet and peaceable trial.
Id. at 802.
In the Odell case, a state prisoner petitioned a federal district court for a writ
of habeas corpus on the grounds that the trial judge's order that he be handcuffed
throughout his murder trial was a violation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. From the facts alleged in the petition, it appeared that no
compelling grounds existed for imposing the restraint. In affirming the denial of
the petition, the court indicated that the proper forum to test the reasonableness of
the judge's determination that restraint was necessary is the state appellate courts.
As petitioner failed to appeal his conviction in the state court, he was precluded
from collaterally attacking the judge's discretion by the use of the habeas corpus
proceeding. By way of dictum, the court indicated that in certain circumstances, the
federal courts would reverse a conviction if the restraint imposed was clearly
unreasonable.
Thus in the Chessman case, the ruling of the state supreme court that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing the restraint on Chessman's freedom
of action would preclude raising the question in a habeas corpus proceeding, under
the Odell court's reasoning, unless clearly unreasonable.
86. The appellate courts generally recognize that such a circumstance may be
critical in sustaining the use of physical restraints in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g.,
People v. Kimball, supra note 85; People v. Harris, 98 Cal. App. 2d 662, 220 P.2d
812 (1950); State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 180, 167 P.2d 476 (1946).
87. See People v. Chessman, 88 Cal. 2d 166, 176, 288 P.2d 1001, 1007 (1951).
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a primary obligation to maintain order in the court room and to
prevent potential areas of conflict from flaring into overt acts of
violence, he must of necessity be granted wide discretionary power
in determining whether certain actions are justified under all the
conditions of a particular case.88 Thus, although it is doubtful
whether the trial court's decision to restrict Chessman's movements
was absolutely necessary, it is clear that it was related to the end
of preventing possible disorders from occurring in the court room
and was not an abuse of discretion.
C. Caliber of Chessman's Defense
An appellate court will overturn a criminal conviction if it finds
that the accused's defense was conducted in such a grossly incom-
petent manner that in effect he was denied a fair trial.89 In a situation
in which an accused conducts his own defense, as Chessman did,
it is more likely that it would be handled in an incompetent manner
than when the defense is conducted by an attorney. But as the in-
stances where a defendant waives his right to counsel and conducts
his own defense are rare, 0 few general rules have been established
to determine when the lack of skill on the part of the defendant will
result in a reversal of a conviction.Y' Appellate courts, however, ap-
88. The range of the discretion allowed a trial court is illustrated. by the decision
in State v. Van Bogart, 85 Ariz. 63, 331 P.2d 597 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
973 (1959). In this case, defendant caused considerable disturbance by shouting
and cursing during the early stages of the trial. After a warning, the trial judge
ordered the defendant gagged while the jury was being impaneled and the com-
plaint read. At this point, the gag was removed and the defendant was allowed to
conduct his own defense. In viewing the trial judge's action drastic but reasonable
under the circumstances, the Arizona Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the
necessity that courts be kept free from disturbances. Although the Van Bogart case is
extreme and may be subject to valid criticism, the fact remains that the attitude
of the appellate court is typical. See, e.g., Cwach v. United States, 212 F.2d 520 (8th
Cir. 1954); People v. Kimball, 5 Cal. 2d 608, 55 P.2d 488 (1936); People v. Deveny,
112 Cal. App. 2d 767, 247 P.2d 128 (1952); State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 180, 167 P.2d
476 (1946).
89. In Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949), the petitioner had not been offered
the services of counsel by the court and had conducted his own defense. In reversing
the conviction, the Court held that the trial judge had not sufficiently protected the
rights of the petitioner. The Court, through Mr. Justice Reed said:
Furthermore, the fair conduct of a trial depends largely on the wisdom and
understanding of the trial judge. He knows the essentials of a fair trial. The
primary duty falls on him to determine the accused's need of counsel at arraign-
ment and during trial. He may guide a defendant without a lawyer past the
errors that make trials unfair. . . . Obviously a fair trial test necessitates an
appraisal before and during the trial of the facts of each case to determine
whether the need for counsel is so great that the deprivation of the right to
counsel works a fundamental unfairness.
Id. at 781.
90. BEANv, op. cit. supra note 72 at 59.
91. For illustrations of the approaches taken by the courts in determining whether
a defendant's conduct of his own defense was so incompetent as to require reversal,
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pear reluctant to reverse convictions solely on the ground that a
defendant has conducted his own defense in a bungling manner. 2
This reflects an attitude on the part of appellate courts encouraging
indigent defendants to accept court-appointed counsel for offenses
of a relatively serious nature.9 3 For this reason, there is little prac-
tical difference between the standards the courts apply in determin-
ing when the overall competence of the defense conducted by an
attorney is of such low caliber as to justify reversal and the situation
where the defendant conducts his own defense.94 In both situations,
the courts allow a reversal only in those rare situations where the
defense approaches a sham and glaring errors are repeatedly com-
mitted by counsel.95 Because the minimal standard of competency
see, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953); Zahn v. Hudspeth,
102 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1939); People v. Adame, 169 Cal. App. 2d 587, 337 P.2d
477 (1959); People v. Pearson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 811, 311 P.2d 142 (1957).
92. In Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949), defendant waived
counsel and defended himself. In affirming the conviction, the court stated, in the
following manner, a general attitude taken by appellate courts when an accused
conducts his own defense:
When appellant chose to proceed without counsel, he chose a course of action
fraught with the danger that he would commit legal blunders. But having made
that choice he did not thereby acquire the right to have the court act as his
counsel whenever he seemed to be blundering. It cannot be said that the court
denied him representation of counsel, or denied him a fair trial, because the
judge refrained from intermeddling.
Id. at 670. Also see Shelton v. United States, supra note 91; Zaln v. Hudspeth,
supra note 91; People v. Adame, supra note 91.
93. The following excerpt from People v. Adame, 169 Cal. App. 2d 587, 337 P.2d
477 (1959), is typical of the trial court's efforts to have a defendant represented by
counsel in a pending trial:
The Court: I am in no position to provide you with an advisor at this late date.
This Court has previously appointed Mr. Barcroft to represent you. I have
known Mr. Barcroft for twenty-five years. I know him as an able, conscientious,
well-informed attorney, possessed of more than average, or more than ordinary
ability .... This is not a case where the Court has appointed an inexperienced
young lawyer just out of school. . . . Now if you are dissatisfied with Mr.
Barcroft and this case is ready for trial and you want to try this case yourselves,
that is perfectly all right with me. But if that situation should develop, I am
not going to act as your attorney. If you elect to represent yourselves, you will
be bound by the same rules of conduct we expect and demand from every
attorney. You must be familiar with the rules of evidence, and if the questions
you ask are improper or improperly asked, they will not be permitted to be
answered. Now, whatever you want to do is entirely up to yourselves. There is an
old, old saying that he who acts as his own attorney has a fool for a client, and
while it is an old saying, I think it is a true saying.
Id. at 591-92, 337 P.2d at 480-81.
94. Compare Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953); Zahn v.
Hudspeth, 102 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1939); People v. Adame, supra note 93; People
v. Pearson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 811, 311 P.2d 142 (1957), with Miller v. Hudspeth,
176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949); People v. Amado, 167 Cal. App. 2d 345, 334 P.2d
254 (1959); People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
95. See, e.g., Miller v. Hudspeth, supra note 94; Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d
101 (5th Cir. 1944), and People v. Amado, supra note 94. For examples where con-
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required of attorneys is so low, a defendant acting as his own coun-
sel gains no preferential treatment from the courts merely because
he is a layman unfamiliar with the intricacies of the legal system.
Chessman centered his defense around the theory that he was a
"professional" criminal and thus would not have committed the
crimes for which he was charged in the blundering manner in which
he contended they were committed." Consequently, he did not ob-
ject to certain evidence and conduct on the part of the prosecution. 7
This tactic very likely had a negative affect on the jury and did not
favorably impress the appellate court.98
However, Chessman's theory of defense does not appear to be
the product of incompetence, but rather appears to have been a
calculated risk on Chessman's part that the jury would accept his
principal contention. His plan apparently was carried out, but, of
course, it did not have the desired effect. Although Chessman's
theory of defense was ill-advised, that is not to say he conducted
the defense in such a grossly incompetent manner that he did not
receive a fair trial." This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that
Chessman appeared to be extremely competent in the art of cross-
examination of key witnesses during the trial.' 0
victions have been held invalid for incompetency of counsel, see United States ex rel.
Hall v. Ragen, 60 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1945); People v. DeSimone, supra note 94.
96. See People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 177-78, 238 P.2d 1001, 1008 (1951).
97. Ibid.
98. ibid.
99. The following account indicates the extended nature of the trial proceedings:
The trial was a lengthy one, beginning April 29 and ending May 21, 1948. Peti-
tioner defended himself. Eighty-one witnesses testified and were called or
recalled a total of more than 120 times. ... It will be noted that the testimonial
evidence alone comprises 1500 pages of the disputed Reporter's Transcript.....
Eighty-four exhibits were offered.. .. There were two full days of argument
to the jury .. . More than 50 different complex instructions were given.
Petition for certiorari, pp. 28-29, Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957). Although
length alone does not necessarily indicate the caliber of the defense, it does show
that Chessman conducted his defense in a vigorous manner.
100. In the following excerpt, Chessman is cross-examining Mary Alice Meza, one
of the state's prosecuting witnesses:
Q Do you recall stating to the police at the time you reported this matter, that
this automobile had a reddish glow or tint, or that the numerals were red on
the dash?
AYes.
Q And that two panels of the instruments were red, both of them?
A Yes.
Q The entire dash, then, from one side to the other, had this same reddish
appearance?
A No, only a couple of them; not everything. I would say just two circles I
remember being illuminated.
Q What do you specifically remember?
A Specifically remember about what?
Q What part of the dash was red?
A There was the clock and some other thing by the driver's wheel.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:941
IV. DA= PENLTs UNDER SECTION 209
Among the seventeen felonies of which Chessman was found
guilty were four convictions of kidnapping for purposes of robbery
under section 209 of the California Penal Code.101 The jury, which
found that Chessman had inflicted bodily harm 102 upon two female
victims by forcing them to commit acts of sexual perversion, set the
penalties for two of the kidnappings at death. For the other two
convictions of kidnapping, which were based upon the robbery of
the clothing store,10 3 Chessman received a life sentence without the
Q Directly in front of the driver's wheel or approximately directly in front?
A Approximately in front of it.Q I will show you Exhibit 26, and ask you if this is a fair representation of the
instrument panel you saw. Of course, you cannot tell the color.
A Yes, that looks similar to it. Yes, I would say that would be it.Q To your knowledge, did this bandit's automobile have a radio?
A I don't remember anything about it, if it did. I dont remember.
Q Was there ever any talk about a radio, by the bandit; did he ever mention
that he had one?
A No, not that I recall.Q Did he mention he was capable of receiving police calls?
A Not that I recall.
Q Did you see anything on the instrument panel to indicate there was a radio
in the automobile?
A I didn't notice.Q Didn't you see anything in the automobile to indicate that there may be a
portable radio in that automobile?
A I don't remember.
Q Did you see anything in this automobile other than the things you have
already testified to, a gun and, flashlight, anything on any of the seats of this
car?
A No, I don't remember anything else.
Q You were observing very closely during this time, attempting to get all the
impressions you could to assist the police; is that right?
A I wasn't -I was doing it very generally. I was not aware of the fact that I
was actually doing it for the police. I remember I was just observing things, just
generally; not well.
Transcript, pp. 410-12.
101. At the time of Chessman's trial, CAL. PEN. CODE § 209 provided:
Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, con-
ceals, kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with
intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom,
reward or to commit extortion . . . or robbery or to exact from relatives or
friends of such person any money or valuable thing, or who aids or abets any
such act, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall suffer death or
shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life without possibility
of parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same, in cases in which the
person or persons subjected to such kidnaping suffers or suffer bodily harm or
shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life with possibility
of parole in cases where such person or persons do not suffer bodily harm.
102. Bodily harm under § 209 is defined as follows: "any touching of the person
of another against his will with physical force in an intentional, hostile and aggra-
vated manner, or projecting of such force against his person." People v. Tanner, 3
Cal. 2d 279, 297, 44 P.2d 324, 332 (1935).
103. See text at 942 supra.
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possibility of parole. Since the existence of the two death penalties
rendered the validity of the life sentence under section 209 aca-
demic, Chessman had throughout his appeals centered his attack
on the validity of the former. In 1951, after Chessman was convicted
of kidnapping, but before the California Supreme Court had passed
on his appeal, the California legislature amended section 209.104
Prior to the amendment, the language of the statute permitted a
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole or a
death sentence merely for a conviction for detaining a victim while
committing robbery when bodily harm had also been inflicted. 0 5 In
construing the statute the California Supreme Court, in People v.
Knowles,0 0 refused to depart from the literal meaning of the statute
and held, in effect, that an act which was nothing more than armed
robbery was within the conduct proscribed by section 209 and pun-
ishable as kidnapping. 0 7 Because of this harsh result,10 8 the Cali-
fornia legislature, by the 1951 amendment, made asportation an
essential element for a conviction of kidnapping for purposes of
104. The first paragraph of CAL. PEN. CODE § 209, after its amendment in 1951,
provides:
Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals,
kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to
hold or detain, or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom, reward or
to commit extortion or to exact from relatives or friends of such person any
money or valuable thing, or any person who kidnaps or carries away any indi-
vidual to commit robbery, or any person who aids or abets any such act, is
guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall suffer death or shall be
punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life without possibility of
parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same, in cases in which the person
or persons subjected to such kidnaping suffers or suffer bodily harm or shall be
punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life with possibility of parole in
cases where such person or persons do not suffer bodily harm.
105. When the inapplicable terms were deleted from the pre-1951 statute it
provided: "Every person who . . . holds or detains . . . [another person] to commit
. . . robbery . . . shall suffer death or shall be punished by imprisonment in the
State prison for life without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the jury trying
the same, in cases in which the person . . . subjected to such kidnaping suffers . . .
bodily harm." See note 101 supra.
106. 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950). The defendant, David Knowles, was
Chessman's accomplice in the robbery of the clothing store. Both men were captured
in a stolen car with the goods taken from the store in their possession. Knowles, at a
separate trial, was sentenced under § 209 to life imprisonment without possibility of
parole.
107. Although Knowles was convicted for detention with bodily harm, the court's
construction of § 209 allowed a conviction for kidnaping resulting in a life sentence
for what amounted to nothing more than robbery. This construction gave a prosecu-
tor discretion to prosecute for armed robbery, the maximum penalty for which was
five years under CAL. PEN. CoDE § 213, or for kidnaping under § 209, the penalty
for which was life or life without possibility of parole or death where body harm
had been inflicted.
108. The court in the Knowles case said: "Reasonable men may regard the statute
as unduly harsh and therefore unwise; if they do they should address their doubts to
the Legislature." 85 Cal. 2d at 180, 217 P.2d at 8.
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robbery.10 9 Nonetheless, it is clear that Chessman's convictions could
be sustained under the pre-1951 statute,"0 even though they were
not made fmal by the California Supreme Court until after the
amendment had gone into effect.
However, when the California legislature amended section 209
to change the acts proscribed, it also added a paragraph which miti-
gated sentences of some persons convicted under the previous stat-
ute."' Since the legislature explicitly extended relief to "any person
serving a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of
parole," 112 the relief was seemingly not intended to extend to some-
109. When the inapplicable terms are deleted from § 209 after the 1951 amend-
ment, it provides: "Any person . . . who kidnaps or carries away any individual
to commit robbery ... shall suffer death or shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for life without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the jury
trying the same, in cases in which the person . . . subjected to such kidnapping
suffers . . . bodily harm." See note 104 supra.
In People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 191, 238 P.2d 1001, 1016 (1951), the
California Supreme Court stated that "the detention of the victim during the com-
mission of armed robbery, if committed since the 1951 amendment, is not punish-
able under section 209." Similarly, in People v. Chessman, 52 CaL 2d 467, 496-97,
341 P.2d 679, 697-98 (1959), the court again said that "since the 1951 amendment
of section 209, kidnapping for the purpose of robbery requires some asportation
of the victim....
110. Although § 209 was not explicitly repealed by the California legislature, it is
possible to regard an amendment as a repeal of the statute in its old form and a
reenactment of the statute in its amended form. Under CAL. Cov'T CODE § 9605,
however, an amendment is not to be considered as a repeal and reenactment in the
amended form. Therefore, the common-law rule which provided that the repeal of a
statute without a "saving clause" before a judgment was final operated to discharge
the defendant, see, e.g., Regina v. Inhabitants of Denton, [1852] 18 Q.B. 761, 118
Eng. Rep. 287; Regina v. Inhabitants of Mawgan, [1838] 8 Ad. & E. 497, 112 Eng.
Rep. 927; Miller's Case, [1764] Bl. W. 451, 96 Eng. Rep. 259, has no application to
Chessman.
The legislature, by removing the crime of detention to rob under § 209, did in
effect repeal that part of the law. Although there was no "saving clause" as part of
the amendment which would have permitted future prosecutions under the repealed
statute, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 9608 provides that the termination of any law creating
a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the punishment of an act already
committed in violation of the terminated law.
111. The final paragraph of § 209, added by the 1951 amendment, provides:
Any person serving a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of
parole following a conviction under this section as it read prior to the effective
date of this act shall be eligible for a release on parole as if he had been
sentenced to imprisonment for life with possibility of parole.
112. That part of the amendment which mitigated the sentences of the persons
serving a life sentence without possibility of parole can be interpreted to mitigate
the sentences of all persons so sentenced regardless of whether their convictions were
based on asportation or detention. This problem is not applicable to Chessman, how-
ever, because the amendment gave no direct relief to persons under death sentences.
Nonetheless, it can be argued that, because the legislature made no distinction
between those convicted for detention and asportation, the court, when it assumed
that one under a death sentence for detention would not be so punished after 1951,
could also properly have followed the legislature's practice and disregarded the
distinction between a conviction for detention and asportation.
one like Chessman who was under sentence of death. This conclu-
sion can be justified on two grounds. The first, and perhaps the more
convincing, argument which supports this view is that the language
of the amendment is inapposite to any death penalty. Presumably,
the legislature was aware that at the time it amended the statute
there were death penalties which had been imposed under the stat-
ute but which had not been executed. Thus, the omission of language
extending the relief to those persons under a death penalty was prob-
ably an intentional limitation. Second, the bodily harm inflicted by
persons under a death penalty was probably in most cases more seri-
ous than the bodily harm inflicted by persons under sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. The legislature may have
reasoned that in a case where there had been minor bodily harm and
where the jury had regarded the death penalty as too severe for
the crime committed, the jury had no choice but to impose a life
sentence without possibility of parole. Thus, where the jury had so
acted, it was highly probable that even the lighter sentence of life
without the possibility of parole had been too harsh.
Whatever the actual legislative intent, however, the California
Supreme Court recognized in the amendment a strong desire to
mitigate the general harshness of the results under the previous
statute. Therefore, when in 1951,11 and again in 1959," 4 on appeal
to the California Supreme Court, Chessman urged that under the
amendment his death sentences should be reduced to lesser sen-
tences,' the court assumed expressly that the amendment was in-
tended to give relief to a person under a sentence of death for de-
taining to rob." 6 It would seem that the court based this assumption
on grounds independent of the provision of the amendment which.
only mitigated sentences of life without possibility of parole. In
113. People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 288 P.2d 1001 (1951).
114. People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 341 P.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
115. Another theory which Chessman argued on appeal was one of abandoned
intent -that he robbed or attempted to rob his victims, abandoned his intention to
robs, and then carried his victims away to commit bodily harm. Since under the
statute the purpose for the asportation must be robbery, extortion or ransom, Chess-
man argued that as a matter of law the evidence could not support the verdicts. The
court rejected this argument when, in People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 186, 288
P.2d 1001, 1013 (1951), it said:
This argument is without merit. A defendant who engages in a course of conduct
toward a female victim which includes robbery or attempted robbery, asporta-
tion of the victim, and the commission of sex crimes may present such argument
to the trier of fact. But we cannot say as a matter of law that at some point of
time during the abductions of his female victims defendant ceased to be a
robber and became a kidnaper whose sole purpose was to inflict bodily harm by
forcibly committing sex crimes.
116. In People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 497, 841 P.2d 679, 698 (1959),
the court said "one sentenced to death for conduct amounting to no more than
robbery with infliction of bodily harm before the 1951 amendment should not be so
punished after the amendments effective date."
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other words, the court seems to have based its assumption that no
one should be punished by death for detaining to rob after the 1951
amendment on the ground that the crime of detention was no longer
punishable under section 209. The process by which the court ar-
rived at this position is by no means clear. Presumably, no one who
had committed a violation of section 209 before 1951 and who was
punished after 1951 under the pre-1951 statute 117 would be sen-
tenced to life without possibility of parole since a sentence of life
without possibility of parole would automatically, by operation of
the 1951 amendment, be mitigated to life with possibility of parole.
The death penalty could, however, continue to be imposed after
1951 for mere detention where the crime had been committed prior
to 1951 but where trial did not occur until after the amendment be-
cause the legislature neither mitigated the death penalty under sec-
tion 209 nor barred a conviction for detention to rob."8 The rule
which the court cites, that "the offender who commits an offense be-
fore the amendment of the statute imposing the lighter sentence gets
the benefit of the lighter punishment . . ." 19 is irrelevant to the
death sentences in the Chessman case because the legislature did not
lighten the penalty of death but only abolished the crime of detain-
ing to rob. Thus, while the court's extension of relief to one sentenced
to death for detaining to rob was the ground upon which the court
proceeded, the wisdom of this extension is questionable.
Once the court had held that no one after 1951 should be pun-
ished by death for detaining to rob, it determined that Chessman's
convictions were based on asportation and not mere detaining to
rob. The court's determination may, however, be open to question
because, as in the case of many jury verdicts, it is impossible to
be absolutely certain of which acts the jury convicted Chessman
under section 209. When all of the circumstances surrounding the
verdicts are examined, there is a possibility that Chessman's convic-
tions for kidnapping were based on mere detention to commit rob-
bery accompanied by bodily harm to the victims.
Since the jury was instructed that the kidnapping was complete
upon the seizing of the victim, 20 it is possible that the jury may
have never actually considered the question of asportation. Once it
had established Chessman's guilt on the basis of detention to rob
under this instruction, the only other necessary question was
117. Since the provision relating to detention to rob was removed by the amend-
ment of § 209, it was in effect repealed. However, persons committing the crime of
detaining to rob before 1951 could continue to be prosecuted under CAL. Cov'T CODE
§ 9608 for that crime.
118. See note 117 supra.
119. People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 191-92, 238 P.2d 1001, 1016-17 (1951).
120. People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 496 n.16, 341 P.2d 679, 697 n.16 (1959).
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whether Chessman had inflicted bodily harm on the victims. Thus,
the jury may have focused on the question of whether Chessman
had detained the victims to the exclusion of whether he had
asported them. This possibility becomes somewhat stronger for
the reason that portions of the trial court's instructions emphasized
that under the statute mere detention was sufficient for a conviction.
The record of the Chessman trial shows that the following instruc-
tion was given:
WHEN CABrYiNG AWAY OF SEIZED PEnsON NOT NECESSAnY-
PENAL CODE § 209
When a person seizes another with intent to hold or detain him, or
seizes him in the act of holding and detaining him, to commit robbery,
such seizure constitutes a crime whether or not the person so seized is
carried or otherwise moved any distance from the place of the attack.' 21
In support of its position, the court pointed out that the form
of the jury's verdict which found Chessman "guilty as charged"
was a finding that Chessman had asported his victims because the
charges of the indictment which had been read to the jury included
the crime of asportation 22 The court's assertion is not, however, a
wholly satisfactory answer to the argument that the jury may have
based its decision on the detention of the victims for purposes of rob-
bery and that it may not have passed on the question of asportation.
The court's position is tenuous insofar as it rests on the inter-relation
of the verdict form and the counts of the indictment which were
read as part of the instructions. Although the counts of kidnapping
included "seize, confine, abduct, conceal, kidnap and carry away,"1 23
and were incorporated into the instructions, it is unrealistic to as-
sume that a jury which had been instructed that it need go no
farther than to find detention would consider whether Chessman
committed each of these acts. Because the language of the kidnap-
ping counts is couched in mechanical, legalistic terms, it is more
probable that the jury followed the specific instructions relating to,
the adequacy of finding mere detention than that it considered sepa-
rately whether Chessman had seized, whether he had confined,
121. Instructions, p. 125.
122.
The verdict as to each death penalty count reads, "We ...find the Defendant
guilty of Kidnapping for the Purpose of Robbery, a felony, as charged . . .and
find that the person named suffered bodily harm and fix the punishment at
death." (Italics added.) The offense charged in each of the two counts was
"idnapping for the Purpose of Robbery, a felony, committed as follows: That
the said Caryl Chessman . . . did willfully, conceal, unlawfully and feloniously
seize, confine, abduct, kidnap and carry away [the female victim] ... with the
intent to hold and detain and ... did hold and detain said [victim] ....
with intent, and for the purpose of committing robbery." (Emphasis added.)
People v. Chessman, 52 CaL 2d 467, 497, 341 P.2d 679, 698 (1959).
123. See note 122 supra.
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whether he had abducted, whether he had concealed, whether he
had kidnapped, and whether he had carried away his victims.
But despite the factors which point to the possibility that the
jury could have rendered the death penalties for a conviction based
on detention, the court's position that the verdicts were based on
asportation is a reasonable one. The sequence of events constituting
the incidents with the two women as they were established by the
testimony at trial reduces the likelihood that a verdict could have
been based on detention alone. In the first incident Chessman took
his victim's purse, forced her to walk twenty-two feet into his car,
and forced her to commit an act of sexual perversion. He took
money from the purse he had taken earlier and then permitted her
to leave the car. 24 In the other incident, Chessman attempted to rob
his victim, but discovered she had no money. He then forced her
into his car, drove to an isolated spot, compelled her to submit to
sex crimes and then drove her to the vicinity of her home.125
Under California law the kidnapped victim need be carried away
only a matter of feet in order to permit a jury to find a violation of
section 209 on grounds of asportation. 126 The evidence presented by
the state at the Chessman trial was that the bodily harm was in-
flicted after the asportation had occurred. It is obvious that the
jury believed the evidence relating to the bodily harm 2 and that
at the very least they also believed the testimony related to the de-
tention of the victims. Since the asportation was the conduct which
bridged the two acts, the jury undoubtedly also believed the testi-
mony that Chessman had carried away his two victims. Had the
jury disbelieved the testimony of asportation, they would have
be enforced to accept the fact that Chessman had committed the
sex crimes in the cars of the victims' escorts. Such a deduction is
wholly unwarranted by both the state's evidence and Chessman's
general denial.
It must be conceded, however, that there was no way in which
124. Transcript, pp. 62-71.
125. Transcript, pp. 377-89.
126. The court in People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001, held that
it was the fact, not the distance, of the forcible removal which constituted the
kidnapping. Also see People v. Oganesoff, 81 Cal. App. 2d 709, 184 P.2d 953 (1947)
(carrying victim from car in front of house into house supported conviction of dd-
napping); People v. Shields, 70 Cal. App. 2d 628, 161 P.2d 475 (1945) (carrying
victim from front of house to roof supported conviction of kidnapping); People v.
Melendrez, 25 Cal. App. 2d 490, 77 P.2d 870 (1938) (forcing victim to walk fifty
to seventy-five feet constituted kidnapping); People v. Cook, 18 Cal. App. 2d 625,
64 P.2d 449 (1937) (carrying victim from sidewalk into house constituted kid-
napping).
127. It is a necessary deduction that the jury believed that Chessman had inflicted
bodily harm since under § 209 a sentence of death can be rendered by a jury
only if it finds that the victim has suffered injury.
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the California Supreme Court could be absolutely certain of what
acts the jury based Chessman's convictions of kidnapping. There-
fore, in order to avoid the possible criticism that Chessman was
punished too harshly for conduct which the statute no longer pro-
scribes, the court, instead of assuming that the verdicts were based
on asportation, could have placed its decision on a sounder basis
by relying on the literal meaning of the statute. As either an alterna-
tive holding or its sole holding, the court could have grounded its
refusal to mitigate the death penalties on the amendment's inap-
plicability to a death sentence under the pre-1951 statute. Such a
holding would have strengthened the court's position. However,
while a reliance on the literal meaning of the statute might have
been a wiser course, the court's position based on the assumption of
a finding of asportation is not an unreasonable one and cannot be
said to have resulted in an injustice to Chessman.
V. BAs AND EPEJjuIcE oF FEImEAL JuDGEs
A. Disqualification of Federal District Court Judges
A rehearing was scheduled in United States District Court follow-
ing the decision of the United States Supreme Court that Chess-
man's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, charging fraud in the
preparation of the original transcript, should not have been sum-
marily denied.12 On November 30, 1955, Judge Louis E. Goodman,
who had dismissed the original petition, was assigned to preside over
the hearings.'29 At that time, Judge Goodman denied Chessman's
attorney's oral request that he disqualify himself. Later the same
day there was a withdrawal of the request accompanied by a state-
ment by Chessman's attorney to the effect that "after discussing the
matter with his client, he desired to say nothing more on the ques-
tion of disqualification." ' 0 Subsequently, friction apparently de-
veloped between Judge Goodman and Chessman. 13' The major dis-
agreement revolved around the question of the adequacy of the
arrangements provided by the court to permit Chessman and his
attorneys to confer and prepare for the pending hearing.132 Finally,
128. See Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955).
129. See Chessman v. Teets, 289 F.2d 205, 215 (9th Cir. 1956).
180. ibid.
131. See Chessman v. Teets, 188 F. Supp. 761, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
132. For an account of the difficulties allegedly encountered by Chessnian and his
counsel in preparing for the hearing, see generally CssMAX, FACE or Jusn c 81-
99 (1957). Chessman's principle contention is that although the court issued an
order that he and his counsel were to be furnished facilities at San Quentin Prison
between the hours of 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. for the "private and full conduct of such
consultation," the order was not strictly complied with by the prison authorities and
the court, in bad faith, took no action to see that its order was effectively enforced.
Chessman was also of the opinion that Judge Goodman was denying many of the
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a month after oral request for disqualification had been made an affi-
davit was filed pursuant to section 144 of the Judicial Code133 re-
questing that Judge Goodman be disqualified from presiding at the
hearing because of personal bias and prejudice. In filing his affidavit,
Chessman relied on the following facts to support his contention
that Judge Goodman should be disqualified:
(1) Asserted intemperate observations and arbitrary action in denying
the petition when it was originally filed. . . . ; (2) failure to enter a
pretrial order concerning appellant's custody in keeping with views ex-
pressed by the judge in an earlier ex parte pretrial hearing; (3) the ob-
servation made by Judge Goodman, at the pretrial hearing of December
16, 1955 that ". . . this should be in the State of California, but until
there is some change in the statutes, we have got to use this laundry to
take care of this matter. . . ."; (4) asserted failure to enforce a previously
entered order concerning arrangements for conferences between appellant
and his counsel; and (5) refusal to grant as long a continuance as appel-
lant had requested.13 4
Judge Goodman disallowed the affidavit "upon the ground that the
petition on its face, as a matter of law, failed to set forth any facts
showing personal bias or prejudice." 13r
Section 144 of the Judicial Code provides a procedure whereby a
judge of a federal district court may be disqualified from presiding
at a pending proceeding on the basis of "personal bias or preju-
dice.' 36 When one of the parties to an action files an affidavit alleg-
ing that the judge is personally biased or prejudiced against the
movant or in favor of the opposing party, the statute dictates that
the judge "shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall
be assigned to hear such proceeding." 3 7 However, this stringent
language is qualified by the second paragraph of the section:
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias
or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the
beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good
cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may
motions which he was filing during this period for no other reason than his personal
animosity toward Chessman. For a detailed list of the motions filed by Chessman and
his attorneys between December 8, 1955, and January 24, 1956, see Appendix A,
Chessman v. Teets, supra note 131, at 766.
183. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1958).
134. Chessman v. Teets, 289 F.2d 205, 215 n.19 (9th Cir. 1956).
135. Chessman v. Teets, 138 F. Supp. 761, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
136. In this Note, the statute dealing with the disqualification of federal district
court judges for bias or prejudice will be referred to as § 144. The provision was
originally enacted as § 21 of the Judicial Code of 1911. Section 21 was superseded in
1948 by § 144. No material variations exist between § 21 as originally enacted
and § 144 in its present form. For general background of the historical development
leading to the enactment of § 144, see generally Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias
in the Federal District Courts, 11 U. Prrr. L. REv. 415-23 (1950); Frank, Disqualifi-
cation of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 626--30 (1947).
137. 28 U.S.C. 144 (1958).
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file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a
certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.'3 8
The leading case interpreting section 144 is Berger v. United
States,'39 where defendants of German ancestry were prosecuted for
violating the Espionage Act during the First World War. The case
was tried before Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis who vehemently
expressed dislike for all persons of German origin. 40 The court
disallowed an affidavit charging personal bias. The defendants were
convicted and appealed, alleging the disallowance of the affidavit
as error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Judge Landis
should have disqualified himself since this was the type of personal
bias contemplated by the statute. The Court stated that the mere
filing of the affidavit did not automatically disqualify the judge;
rather, the judge had a duty to examine the affidavit to determine
whether it was legally sufficient to show personal bias or prejudice.''
The Court added that the judge against whom the affidavit is filed
may not pass upon the truth or falsify of the charges. 42
In conformity with Berger, it is uniformly recognized that the
judge against whom the affidavit is filed has an affirmative duty to
test the "legal sufficiency" of the affidavit. 43 The standard of legal
138. ibid.
139. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
140. To support their contention that Judge Landis was personally biased against
people of German origin, the defendants affidavit as reproduced in the Courts
opinion stated that:
"If anybody has said anything worse about the Germans than I have I would
like to know it so I can use it." And referring to a German who was charged
with stating that "Germany had money and plenty of men and wait and see
what she is going to do to the United States," Judge Landis said in substance:
"One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the
German Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty....
You have become a citizen of this country and lived here as such, and now when
this country is at war with Germany you seek to undermine the country which
gave you protection.... Your hearts are reeking with disloyalty. I know a
safe-blower, he is friend of mine, who is making a good soldier in France. He
was a bank robber for nine years, that was his business in peace time, and now
he is a good soldier, and as between him and this defendant, I prefer the safe-
blower."
Id. at 28-29.
141. Id. at 36.
142. Ibid.
143. See, e.g., Freed v. Inland Empire Ins. Co., 174 F. Supp. 458, 461 (D. Utah
1959); United States v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80, 84 (D.N.J. 1954). In Cole v,
Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 872, 876-77 (S.D. Cal. 1948), the court summarized the
role of the trial court in determining the sufficiency of an affidavit of prejudice in the
following manner:
(1) The mere filing of an affidavit does not oust the judge fron the cause.
(2) The judge has the right to determine the legal sufficiency of the affidavit.
(3) The bias or prejudice must be personal, i.e., antagonism or opposition to the
litigant, or favoritism for his opponent.
(4) Definite views on the law, adverse rulings in the case on trial, or adverse
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sufficiency will be examined in the context of the Chessman case to
determine whether Judge Goodman should have been disqualified
under the provisions of section 144.
1. Time Requirement under Section 144. The statute provides that
the affidavit must be filed "not less than ten days before the be-
ginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good
cause shall be shown for failure to fie it within such time." '4 This
provision has been strictly construed by the courts and failure to
comply with the requirement is grounds for the automatic dismissal
of the affidavit regardless of the sufficiency of the alleged preju-
dice. 14 This result is justified since the section is intended to provide
a procedure to disqualify a judge for personal bias acquired prior to
the pending litigation, not to provide an instrument for delay or to
allow a party. to "sample" the presiding judge's attitude before
deciding if he wants to 'keep" the judge.'4 6
Because the term had begun when Judge Goodman was assigned
to preside over the rehearing, it was impossible for Chessman to
rulings against the suitor in other cases or in cases involving similar facts do not
constitute such disqualification, even in a criminal prosecution.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1958).
145. In Hibdon v. United States, 213 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1954), the defendant
had been convicted of a criminal offense. On appeal, he alleged denial by the trial
court of his affidavit of prejudice. Defendant, acting as his own counsel, failed to
file the affidavit within the time required by the statute. In rejecting defendant's con-
tention that the requirement should be relaxed because of the fact that defendant
was acting as his own counsel, the court said:
We think that appellant has presented no adequate reason why the letter of
the statute should not be applied in its requirement that an affidavit of bias
and prejudice against a trial judge must be filed at least ten days before the
commencement of the term at which the defendant is to be tried. It would be,
in our judgment, against public policy in the administration of justice in crim-
inal cases to permit a trial judge to be sworn off the bench by a defendant
who undertook to prepare his own affidavit of bias, without employing an at-
torney or requesting appointment of one to aid him.
Id. at 869. Also, see Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
146. It should be noted that if a judge determines that the affidavit filed under
§ 144 is "legally insufficient" and refuses to disqualify himself, his decision is not
reviewable until after an adverse judgment is rendered against the movant. See, e.g.,
Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3rd Cr. 1958); Korer v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211
(7th Cir. 1954). Thus, there is a certain degree of risk involved in filing an affidavit
of prejudice. Although a judge may go out of his way to be impartial to protect the
record on appeal, it is more likely that he may be antagonistic toward the party who
filed the affidavit during the remainder of the trial. This possibility coupled with
the fact that relatively few cases can be found in which an appellate court has re-
versed a decision on the ground that the trial judge wrongfully failed to disqualify
himself leads to the inference that the remedy available to the moving party may
be grossly inadequate. The following are the only cases found in which an appellate
court reversed a trial court's determination that an affidavit involved was not legally
sufficient: Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921); Schmidt v. United States,
115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940); Morris v. United States, 26 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1928);
Nations v. United States, 14 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1926); Lewis v. United States, 14
F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1926).
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have filed the affidavit ten days before the beginning of the term
of the federal court. His petition, however, would have been prop-
erly filed had he complied with the good cause requirement of sec-
tion 144. To satisfy this requirement, the affidavit must be filed "as
soon as practicable before the term begins, or if the disqualifying
facts are not discovered before its beginning, as soon thereafter as
practicable." 147 There was no good cause for his late filing because
the basic ground on which he predicated his charge of bias was
known to Chessman at the time Judge Goodman was selected to
preside at the second hearing.148 For this reason, failure to file the
affidavit until a month after the oral request for disqualification had
been made would clearly violate the time requirement of section
144 and be fatal to the motion.
49
2. Requirement that Bias be Personal. The bias charged in the ai-
davit must be personal in nature and supported by the allegations
upon which the belief is based.' 50 The courts have drawn a distinc-
tion between personal bias and bias which is derived from the evi-
dence presented at a judicial proceeding. 151 In the former case, the
147. Reflor v. Lansing Drop Forge Co., 124 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1942).
148. Chessman v. Teets, 289 F.2d 205, 215 (9th Cir. 1956).
149. If Chessman had filed his affidavit of prejudice within a reasonable time after
learning that Judge Goodman was to preside at the rehearing, the time requirement
of § 144 would have been complied with. However, the statute makes no provision
for a party who has knowledge of the facts upon which the alleged bias is predicated
to delay a month before filing the affidavit in order to see if the judge was in fact
biased against him. See Behr v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 233 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.
1956); Hibdon v. United States, 218 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1954); Eisler v. United
States, 170 F.2d 273, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
150. See In re Lisman, 89 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1937); Craven v. United States, 22
F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 627 (1928); United States v.
16,000 Acres of Land, 49 F. Supp. 645 (D. Kan. 1942); Schwartz, supra note 136,
at 417-28.
151. In Craven v. United States, supra note 150, defendant was originally tried
on a charge of illegally bringing liquor into Boston in violation of the prohibition
laws. The first trial ended in a hung jury. The same trial judge presided at the
retrial which resulted in a conviction. In affirming the trial court's action in refusing
to allow defendant's affidavit of prejudice, the appellate court said:
At most, then, the affidavit charges a "bias and prejudice," grounded on the
evidence produced in open court at the first trial, and on nothing else. We hold
that such bias and prejudice . . . is not personal; that it is judicial. "Tersonal"
is in contrast with judicial; it characterizes an attitude of extra-judicial origin,
derived non coram judice. "Tersonal" characterizes clearly the prejudgment
guarded against. It is the significant word of the statute. It is the duty of a real
judge to acquire views from evidence. The statute never contemplated crippling
our courts by disqualifying a judge, solely on the basis of a bias ... against
wrongdoers, civil or criminal, acquired from evidence presented in the course
of judicial proceedings before him. Any other construction would make the
statute an intolerable obstruction to the efficient conduct of judicial proceedings,
now none too speedy or effective.
Id. at 607-08. See Brown v. Buckhoe, 244 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1957); Moore v.
Buckhoe, 175 F. Supp. 780 (W.D. Mich. 1958), holding that the fact that a cer-
tain district court judge had never granted a writ of habeas corpus to any inmate
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judge would be disqualified; in the latter situation, even though the
judge might be equally biased, it would not be grounds for disquali-
fication.152 Thus an action could be validly re-tried before the judge
who presided at the original trial even though he was biased if the
bias were derived from hearing the evidence at the first trial. 53 For
example, in Tucker v. Kerner,' the court rejected plaintiff's affi-
davit filed pursuant to section 144 in which he alleged that the judge
who was to hear the malicious prosecution suit which was pending
had made the following statement from the bench in a previous
case involving the plaintiff:
[T]he difficulty in this whole case and the sad situation presented by the
whole case is that the persons who have been defrauded [by the plaintiff]
are the poorest and smallest people in America, five or ten dollar people,
those are the people we have to protect around here.' 55
On appeal, in holding that the trial judge was justified in not dis-
qualifying himself, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
the trial judge's remarks did not evince the personal bias contem-
plated by the statute. In explaining its position, the court said:
Every member of this court, every member of any court, every judge, when
he hears a case or writes an opinion must form an opinion on the merits
and oft times no doubt an opinion relative to the parties involved. But this
does not mean that the judge has a "personal bias or prejudice." If it did,
the disqualification of judges would be a matter of every day rather than
the unusual and extraordinary occurrence which the statute is designed to
meet.' 56
Chessman's original petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
turned down by Judge Goodman who was adamant in his view that
the petition lacked merit, referring to the whole affair as "'nickel in
the slot' administration of criminal justice." 157 This statement, cou-
of a certain prison was not sufficient grounds to show personal bias to the extent
necessary to disqualify the judge in future habeas corpus proceedings brought by
inmates of the same prison.
152. Compare Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), with Tucker v.
Kerner, 186 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1950).
153. See, e.g., Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1927).
154. 186 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1950).
155. Id. at 83.
156. Id. at 84.
157. In re Chessman, 128 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Cal. 1955). In the course of his
opinion, Judge Goodman said:
When does the wheel stop turning? What must the citizen think of our "nickel
in the slot" administration of criminal justice? The court would be fully justified
in refusing to consider the present petition as repetitious and an abuse of the
writ of habeas corpus. In fact, as provided by federal statute, I am not "re-
quired to entertain" it ....
Be that as it may, it is sufficient to say that, whether the facts in this petition
are greater or less, either qualitatively or quantitatively, the subject matter,
namely, the irregularity of the appeal transcript, is the same as that previously
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pled with his later remark at the pre-trial hearing to the effect that
he disliked having the federal courts handle California's "laundry"
leads to the inference that Judge Goodman was generally impatient
with the delays connected with the Chessman litigation. Although
such statements exhibit bias, they closely parallel the remarks of
the judge in the Tucker case where the bias was characterized as
having been judicially derived, and thus not grounds for reversal
under existing law.158
At first glance, the distinction between personal and judicial bias
does not seem to be valid because, regardless of the label, if the
judge is sufficiently biased the movant may be denied a fair consid-
eration of his cause. It is the quantum, not the derivation of the
bias which would prejudice the litigant. In the course of a proceed-
ing, however, a judge is likely to make some statements which
though insignificant could be used as a basis for an affidavit of preju-
dice in order to gain a continuance in a subsequent proceeding.
Thus, the personal-judicial distinction serves a useful function in
providing a mechanical device for a district judge to disallow an
affidavit which, although conforming with the time and good faith
requirements of section 144, is tenuous in nature and based on an
isolated statement made by the judge in an earlier proceeding in-
volving the movant. Statements of this nature do not necessarily in-
dicate that the judge is biased, and it is more likely that they only
indicate that the judge became impatient or irritated in a single
instance.
urged. And, as a matter of law, that has been determined not to tender a federal
question.
Id. at 602.
158. The conclusion that Judge Goodman's personal feelings toward Chessman
did not preclude him from being objective in hearings involving Chessman was
fortified in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding. In denying Chessman's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in January, 1960, after rejecting Chessman's contention
that twelve years on death row constituted cruel and unusual punishment, Judge
Goodman said:
However, extra-judicially speaking, the appeal [ecruel and unusual punishment]
of the petitioner in this regard is impressive. It may be that this contention of
petitioner, as well as his claim with respect to the effect of the amendment to
California Penal Code Section 209, may well be asserted to the Governor and
the Supreme Court of California, under their Clemency powers.
Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1960).
In referring to this statement, Judge Chambers of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals remarked:
Perhaps I should not chide the judge for abandoning his robe. Perhaps he
has already received his own reward. The application before me, over Chess-
man s own signature, says of what the judge did: "Trhis is not due process;
it is tyranny." Also, in papers before me, Chessman says (over his sole signa-
ture) of the same proceedings where the same district judge attempted to
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If a judge refuses to disqualify himself on the grounds that the
alleged bias is judicial in nature, but the subsequent proceedings
indicate that he in fact was biased, an effective remedy should be
available at the appellate level. In such a case, the appellate court
should examine the facts alleged in the affidavit in light of the record
of the trial and if the record shows any degree of bias, the judgment
should be reversed.1 9 This would adequately protect the movant's
159. The present procedure for reviewing a trial judge's decision that the affidavit
is not legally sufficient seems to limit the scope of appellate review to the question
whether at the time of the filing, sufficient facts are present to show personal bias
with little emphasis given to the question of whether the judge in fact acted un-
fairly toward the movement in the course of the trial. See, e.g., Berger v. United
States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921); Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1950); Skirvin
v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944); Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605 (1st
Cir. 1927).
It has been recognized that a judge may become personally biased against a party
during the course of the proceedings. See, e.g., Knapp v. Kinsey, 282 F.2d 458 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892 (1956); Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693,
702 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941). Such
bias is to be distinguished from the bias necessary for disqualification under § 144
in that in the latter situation, the bias must be pre-existing. The courts have devel-
oped a remedy for bias which arises during the course of the proceedings and hold
such bias is grounds for reversal. In Whittaker v. McLean, supra, in reversing a
decision on the grounds that the judge had become biased during the course of the
trial, the court said:
Often some degree of bias develops inevitably during a trial. Judges cannot
be forbidden to feel sympathy or aversion for one party or the other. Mild ex-
pressions of feelings are as hard to avoid as the feeling itself. But a right to
be tried by a judge who is reasonably free from bias is a part of the funda-
mental right to a fair trial. If, before a case is over, a judge's bias appears to
have become overpowering, we think it disqualifies him.
id. at 596.
The basic problem in applying the remedy is to determine the extent of the bias
necessary in order to justify a reversal. The courts have looked to the standards de-
veloped under § 144 in resolving this issue. See Knapp v. Kinsey, supra, at 465-66.
Thus, in effect, there is little practical difference between the quantum of bias neces-
sary under either situation-in either, the bias must be substantial. Compare Knapp
v. Kinsey, supra; Feckham v. United States, supra; Whitaker v. McLean, supra;
Blackmone v. United States, 151 A.2d 191 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959); Wright v.
Mathias, .128 A.2d 658 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957), with Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22 (1921); Calvaresi v. United States, 216 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1954);
Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1950); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391
(4th Cir. 1949); Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
Isolated prejudicial statements made by a judge in the course of a judicial pro-
ceeding are not grounds for reversal. In Blackmone v. United States, supra, the trial
judge had remarked from the bench that "If the jury lets her go, I'll drop dead."
In refusing to reverse a conviction because of this statement, the court said:
To require disqualification, it is necessary to show that the judge's opinion has
become so overpowering in his mind as to amount to personal bias against the
defendant.
Id. at 197. As to Judge Goodman's alleged refusal to enforce certain pretrial orders
and failure to grant a further continuance, if present, these errors could have been
reviewed on appeal. In Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35 (1913),
the Supreme Court stated:
[Section 144] was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a
rights while at the same time, the usefulness of the personal-judicial
bias distinction would be preserved.
Since Chessman's principal allegation of bias was known to him
in time to file an affidavit under section 144, this factor is clearly
not an instance of bias arising during the course of the trial. How-
ever, the denial of the requests for certain orders, Judge Goodman's
statement to the effect that he disliked having a federal court do
California's 'laundry" and the failure to grant a further continuance
are the only proper grounds on which the appellate court could
have found sufficient bias to justify reversal of the district courts
decision.160 Standing alone, these actions by Judge Goodman would
not appear to be a sufficient showing of personal bias to justify re-
versal of the decision.
B. Disqualification of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges
Chessman was given an opportunity to raise a further question of
bias when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Good-
man's determination that the affidavit of prejudice was not legally
sufficient.' 6 Chief Judge Denman dissented from the majority opin-
ion and Judge Lemmon, concurring in the denial of a petition for
rehearing, took occasion to write a supplementary opinion taking
issue with Judge Denman over the questions raised in his dissenting
opinion. 62 After generally attacking Judge Denman's position, he
concluded by stating:
Chessman's case has been before the courts of California and of the
United States for many years. The "law's delay" in this case has become a
national scandal ...
There remains only one more step to be taken in the case of the State
of California versus Caryl Chessman. That step will be to carry out one of
two sentences of death entered against Chessman eight and one half years
ago.
Chessman has been accorded all due process except the long overdue
process of his execution. By such execution, perhaps, the blot upon Cali-
fornia's juristic escutcheon will be, if not wholly erased, at least partly
dimmed.' 63
judge because of adverse rulings made, for such rulings are reviewable other-
wise, but to prevent his future action in the pending cause. Neither was it in-
tended to paralyze the action of a judge who has heard the case, or a question
in it, by the interposition of a motion to disqualify him between a hearing and
a determination of the matter heard. This is the plain meaning of the require-
ment that the affidavit shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning
of the term.
Id. at 44.
160. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
161. Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.) aflirming 138 F. Supp. 761 (N.D.
Cal. 1956).
162. Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205, 221 (9th Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion
on denial of petition for rehearing).
163. Id. at 223.
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This opinion elicited another supplementary opinion by Judge Den-
man who answered Judge Lemmon's charges by stating that the
length of time a case has been before the courts should not be a
factor in determining whether the appellant has been afforded due
process.'6 4
There is no standard which dictates that a judge of a federal court
of appeals must disqualify himself for bias. Section 144 applies only
to federal district court judges and there are no statutory or common-
law procedures which provide for the disqualification of courts of
appeals judges. 16 Whether a judge of a court of appeals is to be
disqualified is apparently solely within his discretion. Likewise,
the question of the disqualification of a Supreme Court justice
is a matter of purely personal concern of the justice involved. 66
It is a matter "which cannot properly be addressed to the Court
as a whole." 167 A system of voluntary disqualification for judges
of higher courts seems to be entirely adequate because the nature
of the appellate procedure Tninimizes the danger that the bias
would have an adverse effect on the decision. There is less intimate
contact with the parties than in a trial proceeding and there is no
danger that a jury may be adversely affected by the judge's attitude;
164. Ibid. (concurring opinion dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing).
In the course of his opinion, Judge Denman stated:
In stating that Chessman has been deprived of the right so recognized by
Judge Hamley [right to be represented at settlement hearing], Judge Lemmon
appears to be moved by the fact, as he states it, that "Chessman's case has been
before the courts of California and of the United States for many years. The
"laws delay' in this case has become a national scandal."
I do not agree with the contention that the same question of law is to be
decided in one way if considered at the beginning of a prosecution, and in a
different way if it is for consideration after seven years of prosecution of the
same case. Equally unfair to Judge Hamley is Judge Lemmon's criticism that
he gave consideration to Chessman's second contention, when the court had no
jurisdiction so to act.
Id. at 223. Judge Hamley wrote the majority opinion in the instant proceeding, con-
curred in by Judge Lemmon.
165. In Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J., 605, 612 (1947), the
author remarks that:
The contemporary disqualification practice of both federal and state courts
is broader than that of the common law. Not only has the principle of pecuniary
interest been extended to keep pace with changing economic institutions, but
relationship between judge and litigant and a variety of other types of judicial
bias have been prohibited in modem practice by the common law.
Expansion of common law concepts has been brought about in the federal
appellate courts, where no statute controls, largely through the exercise of their
own discretion.
Also, for the results of a survey carried out among federal appellate judges indicating
the grounds upon which they would, through the exercise of personal discretion, dis-
qualify themselves from hearing a case, see id. at 637.
166. See, e.g., Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 897 (1945)
(petition for rehearing) (concurring opinion).
167. Ibid.
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and even if a judge were biased, the other members of the court
might act as a check upon him.
Chessman's cause was not ultimately prejudiced in light of the
fact that the Supreme Court reversed this decision on other
grounds." 8 Nevertheless, support is given to the argument that, at
least in the later proceedings, the courts were impatient with the
whole affair and were no longer being wholly objective and un-
biased in their attitudes toward the Chessman case.:"9 The outburst
served only to create another facet in the Chessman litigation which
might lead some to believe that justice has miscarried.
VI. LrGATION IN THE FEDmuL COURTS
The federal courts' treatment of the Chessman case is the primary
factor which allowed Chessman to keep his litigation alive for
twelve years. Although Chessman's repetitious use of habeas corpus
in the federal courts over an extended period of time was not
unique,170 the Chessman case serves to focus attention on the pos-
sible delays and relitigations which result from the fact that a state
prisoner has two forums in which to litigate. 17' Thus any attempt to
168. See Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
169. In Brief for Petitioner, pp. 26-28, Chessman v. Teets, supra note 168, the
point is effectively made by Chessman that the exchange between Judges Lemmon
and Denman received wide-spread coverage in the newspapers. The brief quotes
from an editorial published in the San Francisco Examiner which stated:
"We agree with Judge Lemmon of the United States Court of Appeals that the
law's delays in the Caryl Chessman case are a national scandal....
After this Chessman will come other Chessmans. So long as such creatures
are permitted to subvert justice at will by misusing the right of writ of habeas
corpus, that long will the blot remain."
Id. at 27. The brief concludes on the note that the overall effect of the judicial
bickering is to incite public opinion against Chessman's cause.
170. People v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 2d 478, 165 P.2d 3 (1946), aff'd, 832 U.S. 46
(1947) (six years); People v. Leyra, 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E.2d 673, cert. denied,
345 U.S. 918 (1953) (five years); Commonwealth v. Smith, 862 Pa. 222, 66 A.2d
764 (1949), aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953) (six years); State v. Braasch, 119 Utah
450, 229 P.2d 289 (1951), cert. denied, 842 U.S. 910 (1952) (six years); State v.
Wilson, 88 Wash. 2d 593, 231 P.2d 288, cert. denied, 842 U.S. 855 (1951) (four
years). For a r6sum6 of the facts of these cases see Hearings Before Subcommittee
No. 8 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6, at
45-51 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 Hearings].
171. This problem has occasioned recent attacks on the efficacy of federal habeas
corpus procedure. See, e.g., Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 8 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2 (1959); 1955 Hearings;
supra note 170; Collings, Criminal Law and Administration, 1957 AaurArL Survzy oF
AmUCAN LAW 14-22 (1958); Collings, Criminal Law and Administration, 1956
AssuuALr S -EvEY oF Ammuca_ LAw 114 (1957); Goodman, Use and Abuse of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 813 (1947); Note, 4 UTA L. REv. 260 (1954);
Note, 25 Thma . L.Q. 851 (1952).
Also see Baker, Federal judicial Control of State Criminal Justice, 22 Mo. L. REv.
109, 127 (1957), where the author states:
In many such cases as these it can only be stated with a large measure of truth
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explain the delay in the Chessman case requires an examination of
the mechanics involved in federal habeas corpus procedure as well
as the application of res judicata principles throughout the Chess-
man litigation.
The writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts is made available
to state prisoners whose convictions have been obtained in a man-
ner not consonant with federal constitutional safeguards . 72 How-
ever, the doctrine of comity dictates that federal courts not inter-
fere with state court decisions without giving the state adequate op-
portunity to make a full determination of any federal question which
a state prisoner may raise. 73 To effectuate this doctrine, the Judicial
Code provides that before a state prisoner may petition the federal
courts for a writ of habeas corpus he must exhaust his state post-
conviction remedies. 7 4 These post-conviction remedies have been
held to include an application for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court from the decision of the highest state court deter-
mining the federal question.175
Prior to 1954 the Chessman litigation pursued a normal course in
the state and federal courts. On the issues relating to the adequacy
of the transcript and to the merits of the case, Chessman first ex-
hausted his state post-conviction remedies and then presented in
the federal courts the federal questions which the issues raised. 7 6
This series of litigation was not unreasonably prolonged, 77 nor did
it pose any unusual problems of relitigation of issues which had been
that the only way the state can enforce the death sentence is to precipitate its
execution between the denial of a habeas corpus petition by one court and the
granting of a stay by another.
172. Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1948). See generally Longdorf, Habeas
Corpus A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179 (1948).
173. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1950); Warren, Federal and
State Court Interference, 43 HAnv. L. REv. 345 (1930); Note, Certiorari and Habeas
Corpus: The Comity Comedy, 46 Ir... L. REv. 478 (1951).
174. Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or
the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the
right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented.
For description and analysis of the post-conviction remedies available to Chessman
in California see Note, Post-Conviction Remedies in California Death Penalty Cases,
11 STAx. L. REv. 94 (1958).
175. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1959); Note, Certiorari and Habeas
Corpus: The Comity Comedy, 46 EL. L. REv. 478 (1951).
176. See note 183 infra.
177. After the one year required to prepare and settle the transcript, state pro-
ceedings on the narrow question of whether the settled transcript was adequate to
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passed upon in the same court before.178 Had the litigation been ter-
minated by 1954, the Chessman case would in no way have been
unique.
Although by 1954 the California courts had manifested the opin-
ion that the Chessman litigation was closed,179 the United States
Supreme Court indicated for the first time that there was possible
merit in Chessman's contentions. In this instance, Chessman had
applied to the Supreme Court for certiorari from the denial of a
habeas corpus petition by the California Supreme Court. Certiorari
was denied "without prejudice to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in an appropriate United States district court." 80 Subse-
allow a fair appeal on the merits required approximately sixteen months. Subse-
quently, this question took up an additional seven months of litigation on habeas
corpus petitions in the federal courts.
After the California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari, it required nineteen months for the federal courts
to deal with Chessman's petitions of habeas corpus on the federal questions raised by
the convictions.
Thus, there was a period of five and one-half years before the merits of the
Chessman case had been litigated through the state courts and presented to the
federal courts. Of this time, twenty-five months were spent in the federal courts in
habeas corpus proceedings. While this period may have been longer than the average
amount of time required to litigate a capital case, it cannot be said to be unreason-
ably lengthy. See note 188 infra.
178. The first series of appeals to the state and federal courts was concerned
primarily with the question whether the settled transcript was adequate to provide
a basis for the California Supreme Court to affirm the conviction on the automatic
appeal provided by California law.
The second series of appeals followed the affirmation of the conviction by the
California Supreme Court and was concerned with the totality of the issues raised
by Chessman on appeal, including the following:
(1) that Chessman was forced to go to trial unprepared; (2) that confessions
obtained by force and intimidation and promises of partial immunity were used
in evidence against him; (3) that said confessions were treated as "admissions"
by the court and prosecution with the result that the jury was authorized to
base a verdict of guilty upon these involuntary statements; (4) that the trial
resulting in Chessmans conviction was unfair; (5) that § 209 of the California
Penal Code, under which the death penalties were imposed, is unconstitutional
as applied to Chessman; (6) that petitioner was placed in double jeopardy; and
(7) that due to extrinsic fraud practiced by the prosecuting attorney and the
trial judge the transcript of record was incomplete and further that Chess-
man was not permitted to show that important parts of the proceedings were
missing or were incorrectly recorded.
Chessman v. People, 205 F.2d 128, 129 (9th Cir. 1953). Of course, the basic issue
of the adequacy of the transcript was again adjudicated, but considering the inter-
relation of these issues, this duplication of court effort is not unusual.
179. After it had passed on the merits, the California court consistently denied
Chessman's petitions for writs of habeas c6rpus. Not until 1957, when the United
States Supreme Court remanded the case to the state court to resettle the transcript
with Chessman or his counsel present, did the California court re-open the
litigation.
180. Chessman v. California, 348 U.S. 864 (1954).
Since a denial of certiorari is not an adjudication on the merits, e.g., Brown v. Al-
len, 344 U.S. 448, 491-92 (1953), the fact that a petitioner would not be prejudiced
by a simple denial has led some to contend that the phrase "without prejudice" is
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quently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari twice,181 and re-
manded the case in 1957 to the California courts for further pro-
ceedings regarding the settlement of the transcript. 8 2
Throughout all of the litigation, Chessman complied with the
mechanical procedures required of a state prisoner to gain access
to the federal court.18 3 Furthermore, the federal courts made no
meaningless. In recent years the Supreme Court has used this phrase approximately
nineteen times. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State
Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461, 503-13 (1960). In his article Professor Reitz
suggests that the Court uses this phrase to indicate that some procedural impedi-
ment precluded it from granting certiorari. His suggestion concerning the Chessman
case is that the California habeas corpus decision from which certiorari was sought
rested upon the adequate non-federal ground of res judicata. While this would pre-
clude the Supreme Court from granting certiorari, it might not prevent further
application to the federal district court for habeas corpus. Thus the Supreme Court
could have achieved the same result with a simple denial of certiorari.
It is possible that the phrase "without prejudice" is intended by the Court to
exert a subtle pressure on the district court to give a petition serious consideration
in borderline cases. See Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time
Chart of the Justices, 73 HAv. L. REv. 84, 114 n.88 (1959), where it is stated.
"The Court's practice seems explicable only as a bit of gratuitous legal aid to
prisoners combined with extracurricular communications of Delphic encouragement
to federal district judges."
In the Chessman case the federal district court viewed the phrase as an "invita-
tion" to Chessman to apply for habeas corpus. In re Chessman, 128 F. Supp. 600, 601
(N.D. Cal. 1955). The court of appeals viewed it as an indication of a justiciable
question. In re Chessman, 219 F.2d 162, 164 (9th Cir. 1955).
181. Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955); Chessman v. Teets, 353 U.S. 928
(1957).
182. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
183. The following diagram illustrates Chessman's compliance with the require-
ment of exhaustion of state post-conviction remedies and the progress of the litiga-
tion to the remanding of the case to the California courts in order to resettle the
transcript in 1957:
STATE POsT-Co-vsarlON RENMDImS FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS
Conviction Jun. 25, 1948
Certification of Transcript Jun. 8, 1949 1
TRANscnwT
California Supreme Court May 19, 1950
dismissed appeal charging
inadequacy of transcript.
United States Supreme Oct. 9, 1950
Court denied certiorari.
Dec. 4, 1950 United States district
court dismissed petition
for habeas corpus on
adequacy of transcript.
Feb. 27, 1951 United States court of
appeals denied petition
for certificate of probable
cause.




















Jun. 9, 1952 United States district
court dismissed petition
for habeas corpus on fed-
eral questions raised on
merits.
May, 28, 1953 Affirmed by United
States court of appeals.






Jan. 4, 1955 United States district
court dismissed petition
for habeas corpus.
Apr. 7, 1955 Affirmed by court of
appeals.
Oct. 17, 1955 United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari,
remanding to United
States district court for
hearing regarding possi-
bility of fraud in settling
transcript.
Jan. 31, 1956 United States district
court dismissed petition
for habeas corpus, finding
no fraud.
Oct. 18, 1956 Affirmed by United
States court of appeals.
United States Supreme
Court granted limited cer-
tiorari on question of the
right to counsel at settle-
ment hearing.
Remanded to Califor-
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exceptions in these procedures for the Chessman case. Although
Chessman undoubtedly gained time by being able to maneuver
between state and federal courts, he cannot be blamed for the
delays which were caused by a system of dual sovereignties. Nor can
Chessman be criticized for utilizing the writ of habeas corpus to its
maximum potential. If any criticism lies in the Chessman case, it
lies with the federal courts which allowed Chessman to protract the
litigation beyond the necessary time by considering and passing
upon issues which had been before them on previous occasions.
Although no res judicata effect attaches to the results of a deter-
mination on habeas corpus,""4 section 2244 of the Judicial Code per-
mits a discretionary "res judicata" effect to be given to denials of
petitions for habeas corpus.8 5 Thus, a federal judge may deny the
petition on the grounds that it is repetitious of prior petitions or
that it raises claims which the petitioner could have raised earlier
but failed to do. 88
In 1955, the lower federal courts evinced a desire to terminate the
litigation on grounds of "res judicata" when they invoked section
2244 to dismiss Chessman's contentions that fraud was present in
the preparation of the transcript. 8 7 This position was based on the
ground that Chessman's contentions of fraud had, in substance, been
before the Court previously and that the contentions were only
elaborated in the petition then under consideration.' 8 The United
See generally Appendix to opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, Chessman V. Teets, 854
U.S. 156 (1957); Appendix II, People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 503, 341 P.2d
679, 701 (1959). For complete citations of cases referred to in diagram, see text at
942-44 supra.
184. See Waley v. Johnston, 816 U.S. 101 (1942).
185. Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1948).
No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a
judgment of a court . . . of any State, if it appears that the legality of such de-
tention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior
application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no new ground
not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court is satisfied
that the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry.
186. In commenting on the effect of § 2244, Professor Moore states:
The elementary rule that a denial of habeas corpus is not res judicata remains
undisturbed. A circuit or district judge has complete freedom to entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus despite a previous denial. The point is
that they are not required to do so when there is a concurrence of all of the
following circumstances: (1) a federal judge or court has denied a prior applica-
tion; (2) the petition presents no new ground not theretofore presented and
determined; and (3) the judge or court to whom the present petition is pre-
sented is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by the present
inquiry.
MooRE, Comnmn'A4r ax ON THE U.S. JuricrAL CoDE f 0.03(50) at 488 (1949).
187. In re Chessman, 128 F. Supp. 600, 602 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, Chessman v.
Teets, 221 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1955).
188.
Be that as it may, it is sufficient to say that whether the facts in this petition
1960] NOTE 995
States Supreme Court, however, acted to prolong the litigation by
granting certiorari and writing a per curiam opinion holding that
Chessman's allegations, if proved true, constituted a denial of due
process.18 Since Chessman contended that he was not aware of the
full extent of the fraud at the time of his earlier petitions,19 0 the
Court's action is not entirely without justification.
But no such justification exists for the Court's subsequent 11 hold-
ing that Chessman had been denied due process by not being rep-
resented at the transcript settlement hearing. As a basis for its
decision, the Court stated "that it was not until the present proceed-
ings in the District Court that the facts surrounding the settlement of
the state court record were fully developed." 9 ' However, the find-
ings of fact in the federal district court dealt solely with the issue
of fraud perpetrated by the prosecuting attorney and the substitute
reporter in preparing the record, adding nothing to the Court's
knowledge surrounding the settlement of the record.193 Moreover,
the fact there had been no representation at the settlement hearing
was not susceptible of "development"; it had long been established
that Chessman was neither present nor represented by counsel at that
hearing. 94 Furthermore, the Court had been aware of Chessman's
lack of representation at the settlement hearing for seven years, but
despite the fact that there were ample opportunities to put the
matter at rest, it was not until 1957 that the Court did so."5 '
are greater or less, either qualitatively or quantitatively, the subject matter,
namely, the irregularity of the appeal transcript, is the same as that previously
urged. And, as a matter of law, that has been determined not to tender a
federal question. (Italics in original.)
128 F. Supp. at 602.
189. Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955).
190. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 3, Chessman v. Teets, 348 U.S. 864 (1954).
191. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
192. Id. at 164, n. 13.
193. See Chessman v. Teets, 138 F. Supp. 761 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
194. This fact was adjudicated in the earliest California decision on the transcript
in People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 840
(1950).
195. See Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting in Chessman v. Teets, 854 U.S. 156, 172
(1957):
The present decision states in theory the ideal of due process. But the facts of
this case cry out against its application here. Chessman has received due process
over and again. He has had repeated reviews of every point in his case. The
question of adequacy of the reconstructed record has been here seven times.
The question of Chessman's right to participate in the settlement proceedings
has been here at least four times. Not once before now did a single Justice vote
to grant certiorari on that issue. If the failure to let Chessman, or a lawyer acting
for him, participate in the hearing on the settlement of the record went to juris-
diction ... then we should have granted certiorari when the Supreme Court
of California first held . . . that the reconstructed record was a proper record
for appeal . . . Nearly seven years later we return to precisely the same issue
and not only grant certiorari but order relief by way of habeas corpus. (Em-
phasis added.)
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Since the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a denial of
certiorari can in no way be regarded as an adjudication on the mer-
its,196 it is clear that the early denials of certiorari in the Chessman
case did not foreclose the Court from subsequently granting certio-
rari. Thus, although the Court's action technically was not improper,
waiting seven years to settle an issue which could have been put at
rest long before was not consonant with sound judicial practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
The factor which overshadows all others in the Chessman case is
that a man was confined on death row for twelve years while the
courts laboriously attempted to afford him his rights under the
law. To layman and lawyer alike, the Chessman case has posed the
question of whether our judicial processes have been unable to put
at rest the case of a determined and intelligent criminal who was
capable of fully exploiting the legal issues involved in his case. But
no answer to this question is possible until the more fundamental
question of why it took over a decade to settle the issues involved
in the litigation is resolved.
No single legal issue involved in the Chessman case justified
the delay which turned the case into a cause cgl~bre. Rather, a
combination of fortuitous and unique circumstances culminated in
a series of legal and political issues which in sum total account for
the delay. The fortuitous event of the death of the court reporter not
only gave rise to the major legal issue in the case but, more import-
ant, furnished Chessman time during which he was able to place his
case before the public. This Chessman accomplished by becoming
a widely read convict-author who, while repeatedly professing his
own innocence, lucidly described the conditions of a condemned
man on death row. So effective were Chessman's endeavors to en-
list the sympathies of the public that his case drew international
attention.
It is not inconceivable that the force of public opinion affected the
judicial treatment of the Chessman case. The closer examination
which the United States Supreme Court apparently began to give
the Chessman case in 1955 and in 1957 may have been due in part
to the recognition which Chessman had gained. Whatever force
public opinion exerted on the Court in 1955 and 1957, the Court's
action, which in effect re-opened the Chessman case, is an illustra-
tion of the flexibility which is built into the American system of
criminal law. While this flexibility is required to treat adequately
the unusual case, a just system of criminal procedure also demands
that at some reasonable point in time adjudication becomes final.
196. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 844 U.S. 443 (1958).
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It is, of course, impossible to set an arbitrary time beyond which a
condemned man is precluded from remedial judicial processes be-
cause the complexity of the legal issues involved may in some cases
require that the period of litigation be extended to afford the crim-
inal all of his rights.
Since the legal issues in the Chessman case were not so intricate
that they could not have been resolved without the protracted liti-
gation, no justification can be found here for prolonging the Chess-
man appeals over a twelve-year period. Furthermore, the delay in
the Chessman case was not attributable to an inherent defect in the
structure of our criminal appellate procedure. Rather, the human
factor -the very strength and, paradoxically, the very weakness of
our judicial processes- entered the Chessman case in the form of
judicial indecision. It is this factor, together with several unique but
legally uncomplicated circumstances, which accounts for the un-
precedented delay in the Chessman case.

